I. AI Interfaces

One of the most persistent motifs in science fiction is the Frankenstein plot: A human creates a machine, which then becomes independent and ultimately turns against its creator. The underlying question is one of responsibility—who is accountable for the damage caused by Frankenstein’s monster? In contemporary terms, who bears responsibility for harm caused by artificial intelligence (AI)?

Currently, AI consists of advanced software systems that perform complex tasks, though they remain fundamentally tools rather than autonomous beings. At some point in the future, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may emerge—entities capable of independent thought and possibly even embodied in robotic form. In a previous essay, I explored how such hypothetical AGI might be compared to the halachic category of a golem. In the meantime, however, we are dealing with limited-function AI, such as ChatGPT. How should we understand such AI interfaces from a halachic perspective?

In some respects, these tools appear more “intelligent” than the traditional golem: They can carry on conversations, generate creative content, and even mimic reasoning (albeit based on pre-existing data). On the other hand, they lack autonomy and have no physical form. Can we compare an AI interface to a golem, which has a body and performs physical tasks? The answer depends on how we conceptualize a golem.

II. AI Interfaces and Golems

Rav J. David Bleich (cont., US) identifies four major halachic views concerning the nature of a golem (Jewish Law and Contemporary Issues, pp. 373—382): 1) a golem is a Jew; 2) a golem is a person but not a Jew; 3) a golem is an animal; and 4) a golem is an inanimate object.

According to the first two views, a golem has the appearance or status of a human. It may even be halachically Jewish if created through acts of sanctity. However, these positions generally presume a golem with a physical body and humanoid behavior. While some people cannot speak and are nonetheless considered human, there is no precedent for a human being that interacts solely through digital means without any corporeal form. Therefore, an AI interface cannot reasonably be compared to a golem under the views that classify it as a person or Jew.

Others, liken a golem to an animal; it moves independently and possesses a kind of life force, yet lacks a soul. However, even this comparison falls short. An AI interface does not move, does not possess physical form, and lacks any biological vitality. It lacks the basic characteristics that led these authorities to compare a golem to an animal.

The remaining view is that a golem is an inanimate object. According to this perspective, the golem is akin to a stick or stone, artificially animated but devoid of true life or halachic status. If a golem is an inanimate object, then the same could be said of an AI interface, which consists of code and data operating within a hardware system. It may not even rise to the status of an object in the tangible sense, but for lack of a better halachic model, we might classify AI as an inanimate object with functionality.

III. Liability of an AI Interface

If we categorize an AI interface as an inanimate object, we can explore the resulting halachic implications. Just as one cannot commit murder by smashing a rock, there is no halachic prohibition of homicide in destroying an AI interface. Nevertheless, other prohibitions may apply. We may not destroy inanimate objects without reason due to the prohibition against needless destruction— bal tashchis. Additionally, an AI interface has an owner. If you damage the AI, you cause a financial loss to the owner.

The more complicated question is liability for damage caused by an AI interface. Since AI systems often function unpredictably or semi-independently, any harm they cause would likely be classified as gerama, indirect causation. An owner is generally exempt from paying for indirect damage caused by his property. This would mean that even if ChatGPT reveals the secret recipe for Coca Cola, which would cause millions of dollars in damage, halachically the owner of ChatGPT would not be liable because the damage is indirect.

Rav Asher Weiss (cont., Israel) was asked about someone who was bouncing checks, whether this person is exempt from repaying for the loss caused by the bad check (Responsa Minchas Asher, vol. 1, no. 114). After all, the damage is indirect, gerama. Rav Weiss focuses on the ruling that while we do not force payment of gerama, we do force payment of garmi (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 386:1). It is not clear what the difference is between these two categories. Rav Weiss lists eight approaches discussed in the commentaries. Perhaps most important is that of the Ritzba (quoted in Tosafos, Bava Basra 22b s.v. zos), which Rav Moshe Isserles (Rema; 15th cen., Poland) follows (Choshen Mishpat 387:3). Ritzba says that there is no conceptual difference between gerama and garmi. Rather, garmi is a punishment for any indirect damage that is common and frequent.

Rav Weiss says that in the modern economy, most damage is caused indirectly. If we would never force repayment of indirect damage, Halacha would be unable to guide an economy. Rather, we follow the Rema and Ritzba who rule that when indirect damage is common and frequent, we enforce payment for that damage because it is classified as garmi. He quotes a number of authorities over the generations who invoked this type of concern in requiring payment for indirect damage.

Based on this reasoning, I suggest that halachic liability should apply to damage caused by AI. While the causation may be indirect, it is increasingly common and frequent. As AI becomes integral to business, journalism, healthcare and other sectors, the halachic system must account for such damage within the framework of garmi. Otherwise, we would create vast areas of economic harm with no accountability. Therefore, owners of AI interfaces should be held halachically liable for damage they cause when that damage is typical and foreseeable.

Rabbi Gil Student is the editor of TorahMusings.com. His latest book, Articles of Faith: Traditional Jewish Belief in the Internet Era, is available online and in bookstores near you.