It is widely agreed that the reason Israel was able to win the Six-Day War in June 1967 was because of their air force’s initial success in destroying most of the Egyptian air force while it was on the ground on the first day of the war. I would like to tell this story. Most of my material about June 5 is coming from Michael Oren, “Six Days of War,” (2002).
The story of the few weeks before June 5 is a fascinating one on its own. By the morning of June 5, Israel was encircled by forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria. The initial pre-war threat to Israel had been by Egypt, including their closing the Straits of Tiran to Israel’s shipping (an act of war under international law), massive concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and ordering the removal of the United Nations peacekeeping troops that had been stationed at the borders in the Sinai and Gaza, separating Israel and Egypt.
Very surprisingly, the United Nations quickly complied when Nasser made this request for the troop removal. These troops had been there for a decade, keeping the peace. Also, as a condition for its withdrawal from the Sinai in 1957, Israel had been promised by the Western powers that the Straits of Tiran would remain open to its shipping. (Another factor causing the heightened tension in May was Russia’s false statement to Egypt that Israel had many brigades up north and was poised to attack Syria.)
Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol waited very patiently to see if President Johnson could help open the Straits to Israel’s ships. But after a while, it was evident that the United States was not able to help. Israel’s military realized that in order to survive this multi-front war, Israel had to act immediately, even if it meant firing the first shot. Eventually, Israel understood that the United States “won’t go into mourning” if Israel did so.
We are now at June 5. Planes took off from the airfield in Hatzor, starting at 7:10 a.m. in the morning. By 7:30 a.m., close to 200 planes were in the air. The Air Force commander was Motti Hod, who Ezer Weizman had chosen as his own replacement in 1966. This operation was called “Moked” (Focus). It had been planned by Weizman for five years.
The Israeli pilots had repeatedly practiced it, carrying it out on mock-ups of Egyptian airfields, under near-total secrecy. “A great deal was known about Israel’s targets—the location of each Egyptian jet, together with the name and rank and even the voice of its pilot.” Some of this information was known via espionage. One spy was Wolfgang Lotz, German born, who had posed as a former SS officer while in Egypt until his capture in 1964. Another spy was Nasser’s masseur.
Under the plan, all but 12 of Israel’s jets were sent into the attack, leaving the country’s skies virtually defenseless for this period. There were 11 targets in the first stage of the attack, which were between 20 and 45 minutes away. The planes flew low—sometimes no more than 15 meters (49 feet) above ground—to avoid detection by any of Egypt’s radar sites. Most of the planes initially went west, towards the sea, as part of the deception, before turning back towards Egypt.
“Radio silence was strictly observed … In the event of mechanical trouble, there could be no calls for assistance … They would have to crash in the sea.”
“The Egyptians … did little to shield their planes. These were concentrated by type … each to its own base, allowing the Israelis to prioritize their targets. Though proposals for constructing concrete hangars had been submitted by the air force and approved, none had ever been implemented. Egypt’s jets were parked on open-air aprons … ”
Hod used to say: “A fighter jet is the deadliest weapon in existence—in the sky. But on the ground, it is utterly defenseless.”
Often, wars break out at dawn or dusk. In this case, a low-level 19 year-old had the clever idea to delay the attack a bit to the time when the Egyptian pilots would be eating breakfast. An Israeli general was willing to listen to this idea and agreed.
“Assuming that any Israeli attack would begin at dawn, the MiG’s had already flown their sunrise patrols, and had returned to base at 8:15 a.m. Egyptian time,” (7:15 a.m. Israel time).
A few minutes after Israel’s attacking planes took off, a sophisticated radar in Jordan picked up evidence of the planes. Their officer radioed “Inab” (Grape) to their headquarters in Amman. This was the code word for “war.” This information was then relayed to the Egyptian Defense Minister in Cairo. But the Egyptians had changed their codes the previous day without updating the Jordanians. Also, the Defense Minister had gone to bed a few hours before, and left strict orders not to be disturbed. So, the Egyptian air bases did not receive any warning.
The initial targets were mainly air fields throughout Egypt and Sinai. Many of these had only one runway. Each jet made three passes, four—if time permitted. The first was for bombing and the rest to strafe.
“Priority was to be given to destroying the runways, then to the long-range bombers that threatened Israeli cities, and then to the jet fighters … ”
Israel had special tarmac-shedding bombs, developed jointly with France. Only at al-‘Arish was the runway spared, in order to serve anticipated future runway needs by Israel. In the first half hour, Egypt lost 204 planes, half of their air force, all but nine of them on the ground.
These results were too fantastic to believe. Dayan wrote: “A stone—just one, but of agonizing weight-rolled off the heart.”
Oren continues: “Yet that same stone would remain on the Israeli public. The extent of the Israeli Air Force’s success would be kept secret for as long as possible, delaying a United Nations imposed cease-fire while Israeli tanks rolled into Sinai.”
At 8:15 a.m., Dayan issued the order for the ground war to begin.
At the time of the initial Israeli attack, Egyptian Field Marshal ‘Amer was on a plane in the area along with the Egyptian Air Commander. Another plane in the area at the time had Iraq’s Prime Minister, a senior Soviet adviser, and the Egyptian Internal Intelligence Chief. Because of this, all of Egypt’s 100 anti-aircraft batteries had been issued “no-fire” orders.
The second wave of Israel’s air strikes—with 14 more targets—was also successful, even though the element of surprise was gone. Resistance to it was moderate. Of the 420 combat aircraft in Egypt’s arsenal that morning, 286 were destroyed. Almost all their airfields were rendered inoperable, along with 23 radar stations and anti-aircraft sites. Israel only lost about 17 planes.
The large numbers of Arab aircraft claimed to be destroyed by Israel on that day were at first regarded as greatly exaggerated by the Western press. But when the Egyptian Air Force made practically no appearance for the remaining days of the conflict, the press began to believe Israel’s numbers.
On the morning of June 5, Egyptian radio had announced that 86 Israeli planes were shot down. Field Marshal ‘Amer wired Amman with the news that Israel had lost 75% of its air power. Cairo radio was broadcasting “our planes and our missiles are at this moment shelling all Israel’s towns and villages” and called on “every Arab to avenge the dignity lost in 1948, to advance across the Armistice line to the den of the gang itself, to Tel Aviv.” No one dared tell Nasser the truth that morning.
P.S. Anwar Sadat, who was in the government at the time, did know the truth, having heard it from the Soviet ambassador. Sadat went home, unable to watch the crowds dancing and applauding the “faked-up victory reports.”
Mitchell First can be reached at [email protected].
