The mishna (Gittin 82a) discusses a case where a man divorces his wife, telling her, “you are permitted to everyone except for ploni.” Rabbi Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus) permits her to remarry anyone (other than ploni), while the sages forbid. Instead, he should take it from her and give it back to her, this time without excluding ploni.
Who are the sages? The plural form, חֲכָמִים, makes us think that we’re dealing with many sages. However, looking in other Gemaras, this is not always the case. It would also be nice if the arguing sages were contemporary, of approximately the same scholastic generation or, perhaps, plus or minus one generation. Unless this is a later stratum of the mishna, in which case Rabbi Meir (in the first pass), or Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (in the next) understand that this is a daat yachid, an individual opinion, and fills in what the unnamed contemporaries must hold, as calculating a logical negation.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus was a third-generation Tanna, situated in Lud. His frequent disputant was the second and third-generation Tanna, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chanania, situated in Paki’in, which was between Lud and Yavne. Rabbi Yehoshua is a good candidate for the sages, since Gittin 83b reports a baraita with his “refutation,” namely a derivation of וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר, contrary to Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation of the same verse. Of course, several sages of the next generation also explicitly argue, as we’ll see.
Rabbi Yehoshua’s Baraita
We’d tangentially observe that the baraita on Gittin 83b is extremely strange and suspicious, in that it employs Aramaic, such as דְּלָא אֲגִידָא בְּאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא. And, while there are some early Aramaic baraitot, other aspects of the language and the derasha just so happen to accord with Rabba’s derivation, in Nedarim 70a-b, of a different verse, וְאִם הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ—that if the husband died his authority in nullifying vows reverts to the father: מַקִּישׁ קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה שְׁנִיָּה לְקוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. מָה קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה רִאשׁוֹנָה—אָב מֵיפַר לְחוֹדֵיהּ, אַף קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה שְׁנִיָּה—אָב מֵיפַר לְחוֹדֵיהּ. We may counter that Rabba was aware of the baraita and channeled it into his own derasha on a different verse.
While our printed texts of the baraita don’t include an explicit quote of the verse, several manuscripts do (Munich 95, Oxford 368, Firkovich 187, Vatican 140). Maybe the baraita only recorded the pasuk, with some implicit derivation (e.g. that she should be permitted to any other man), or only recorded the pasuk and the Hebrew derivation, of מַקִּישׁ קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה שְׁנִיָּה לְקוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. Only afterwards was the explanatory Aramaic filled in, as an interjection by the Talmudic narrator. Alternatively, the entire thing isn’t a baraita at all. The Arras manuscript doesn’t introduce the derivation as a baraita, but then injects דְּתַנְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ above the line. The original omission may be an error of haplography, but maybe not.
Refutations
On Gittin 82a, a baraita (also in Tosefta, also in the Yerushalmi parallel) notes that after Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus’s death, four Sages entered to refute him. These were Rabbi Yossi HaGelili (fourth-generation, Lud), Rabbi Tarfon (third and fourth-generation, Lud), the youthful Rabbi Eleazar ben Azarya (third-generation, Yavne), and Rabbi Akiva (fourth-generation, Bnei Brak). To this, Rabbi Yehoshua responded, “we don’t refute a lion after his death.” As Rashi explains, if he were around, perhaps, he’d have a rejoinder. Rabbi Yehoshua said this despite himself having a refutation (if we follow the baraita), or despite himself disagreeing (for Rabbi Eliezer is a singular opinion in the mishna). Regardless, we have our sage or sages.
Rava declares that each Tanna’s refutation can itself be refuted, except for that of Rabbi Eleazar ben Azarya. The Talmudic narrator—it seems, or, perhaps, it’s Rava—proceeds to spell out each refutation. This declaration, כּוּלְּהוּ אִית לְהוּ פִּירְכָא, לְבַר מִדִּפְלוֹנִי is characteristic of Rava and only Rava. He says the same about Shmuel in Yoma 85b (deriving violating Shabbat to save a life), about Shmuel in Megillah 7a (the Megillah was written with divine inspiration), about Shmuel in Chagiga 10a (Sages may nullify vows), and about the last two of several Tannaim in Menachot 66a (that contrary to the Boethusians, the omer count begins after the first holiday rather than the first Saturday). Interestingly, no refutation is offered for Rabbi Yehoshua’s baraita, which appears later in the Gemara. The parallel Yerushalmi also lists these four sages but—I’d guess due to scribal error—omits Rabbi Eleazar ben Azarya’s reason. Also, named Amoraim there discuss/object to refutations by Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, so Rava and the Talmudic narrator are not alone.
Rabbi Eleazar’s the Best
Also, at the conclusion of the baraita, after Rabbi Yehoshua’s chastisement, Rabbi Yossi—a fifth-generation Tanna—declares, רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה מִדִּבְרֵי כּוּלָּן—“I see Rabbi Eleazar ben Azarya’s words more than the words of all of them.” We don’t know why he finds them most persuasive—perhaps because of Rava’s objections—but the language is familiar.
It cleverly calls to mind the Pirkei Avot 2:9, where Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai asked his students to go forth and see the path to which one should cleave/the evil path one should avoid. His students, Rabbi Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus), Rabbi Yehoshua (ben Chanania), Rabbi Yossi (HaKohen), Rabbi Shimon (ben Netanel) and Rabbi Eleazar (ben Arach) each answered, with Rabbi Eleazar answering with a good heart/a bad heart. (Note that many of these plain names—despite lacking a patronymic—are not the familiar fifth-generation ones we know and love, because it’s from an earlier stratum. Rabbi Shimon is not bar Yochai.) Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said that he prefers Rabbi Eleazar ben Arach’s answer to the others, since it encompasses the others.
Here in Gittin, Rabbi Yossi channels this statement, directing it to a different Rabbi Eleazar—namely, “Rabbi Eleazar ben Azarya.” So too, in Yerushalmi Sotah, Rabbi Eleazar ben Shamua says a Sotah scroll cannot be written on parchment from a non-kosher species; while Rabbi Shimon (ben Yochai) says it can, since it will be obliterated. Another Eleazar, namely, “Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon (ben Yochai)” says, “I find Rabbi Eleazar ben Shamua’s words more persuasive than father’s.” Again, I think he’s channeling the famous statement. Admittedly, there are other instances of רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי, but some of these involve Rabbi Eliezer, while the others are that he finds that Tanna’s position persuasive in context X and the disputant’s position persuasive in context Y.
Rabbi Dr. Joshua Waxman teaches computer science at Stern College for Women, and his research includes programmatically finding scholars and scholastic relationships in the Babylonian Talmud.
