Israel should only go to war with Hezbollah after addressing current failures, stabilizing its leadership and improving its regional and international standing.

Despite recent achievements, such as the targeted assassination attempt against Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif, Israel continues to face strategic challenges, not only in Gaza but also in the North where over 60,000 residents remain evacuated, missiles are a daily occurrence, and the economy is shattered. To address the Hezbollah threat and secure Israel’s northern border, it is crucial to understand both international and domestic decision-making contexts.

Analyzing lessons from the current war in Gaza is critical to achieving Israel’s objectives in the north while minimizing time and costs.

In the international context, Israel’s regional standing and military reputation are waning, accompanied by a worldwide surge in antisemitism and the Jewish state’s increasing global isolation.

Meanwhile, Iran and its allies are pressuring Israel through Hezbollah. While American tactical support remains robust, diplomatic support seems less certain, reflecting potential cracks in US-Israel relations to those observing from the sidelines.

In the domestic context, within Israel there are signs of a leadership crisis; fatigue among reservists; increasing distrust in the government; erosion of confidence in Israel’s military leadership and intelligence capabilities, and a sense of diminishing deterrence ability – all critical issues, particularly in the case of an all-out war in the North.

Concurrently, there is an urgent need to restore safety and normalcy for Israel’s northern residents. Therefore, before launching a full-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel must assess the challenges, their significance, and the necessary lessons to implement when formulating its response.

The Challenges Israel Faces

The first challenge is isolation and concern over losing US support.

Internationally, Israel is facing a crisis similar to Russia’s —being perceived as the aggressor — while Ukraine and the Palestinians are perceived as victims.

Hamas’ attack against Israel does not alter this narrative, and even Israel’s supporters criticize its perceived “disproportionate” military response against Hamas, calling for an end to the war.

The significance: Israel’s reliance on global supply chains is crucial for its economy and war effort, and disruptions could jeopardize both. Ensuring stable supply chains, particularly with US support, is vital.

While limited operations in Lebanon might not strain this arrangement, an expanded conflict would necessitate guaranteed support in advance.

The second challenge is “strategic battle fatigue.” Israel is facing the strain of a prolonged war after an already lengthy engagement.

The conflict with Gaza, planned as a long war, diverges from Israel’s security doctrine of short fighting cycles. This was seen as necessary to meet ambitious goals despite military limitations.

Unlike the US, however, Israel is not a global superpower but rather a small nation with reservist-based military forces that are also critical to its economy.

A war in Lebanon would require mass mobilization of reservists, severely impacting the economy and potentially leading to a crisis within the IDF.

The significance: Israel must ensure any war ends quickly, either by using maximum force in minimum time with a surprise attack or by setting modest war goals.

Militarily, the first option is preferable; diplomatically, the second is more viable. Both have drawbacks: Limited campaigns can expand uncontrollably, leaving military and public sentiment bitter over missed opportunities as seen after the Second Lebanon War.

Conversely, maximum force and ambitious goals could result in high civilian casualties and extensive infrastructure damage, as well as accusations of lacking international legitimacy.

The third challenge is simultaneous victory on two fronts. The IDF’s doctrine is to defend Israel on all fronts, prioritizing the defeat of its enemies according to threat level, as waging war on two fronts splits
resources and is undesirable. With the ongoing war against Hamas, the IDF might need to act in the North before finishing in Gaza, risking failure to secure decisive victories and leading to prolonged wars of attrition on both fronts.

The significance: To achieve a decisive victory on one front, Israel must halt fighting on the other by either accelerating a decisive victory in Gaza — possibly by mobilizing additional reserves or recapturing Gaza and imposing martial law to decisively defeat Hamas –—or ending the Gaza war and declaring the current achievements sufficient, while negotiating an agreement for the release of hostages.

If the Israeli government cannot choose, it should avoid launching a war against Hezbollah in the North. In such a case, a war of attrition, short of full-scale war, is the lesser of two evils.

A WAR is fought on both military and diplomatic fronts.

Regarding the war in Gaza, there was a debate on whether to decide the postwar reality before the ground maneuver.

The public felt it was too early, and the government seemingly agreed, focusing on dismantling Hamas before deciding on the war’s end.

This was a mistake. Israel missed the opportunity of its peak military success (the occupation of Gaza City) and failed to gain a diplomatic advantage. Now its military position is too weak for a momentous diplomatic achievement.

Before an all-out war against Hezbollah, Israel must determine the endgame: What will compel Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire, under what conditions, and which military actions will achieve this?

It is also unclear whether a full-scale war in Lebanon would yield better ceasefire conditions than those already brokered by France and the US, which include ending military operations, withdrawing Hezbollah forces 10 km. from the border, and resuming border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.

Unlike the war in Gaza, Israel cannot just plan the first stage and adapt as it goes. This approach leads to prolonged fighting without a clear victory.

Israel’s leaders must agree on and implement a comprehensive war plan that allows for flexibility based on changing conditions.

Leadership and unity are the keys to success: After the failings of October 7, the initial recovery by Israeli military commanders inspired national unity and public faith in the leadership.

This was crucial, as Israel’s enemies see social and political divisions as the state’s main weakness.

However, this unity has since dissolved: Military leadership is in crisis, the National Unity faction has quit the coalition, the war cabinet no longer exists, faith in political leadership is low, protests are on the rise, and public trust in the army is declining.

Is a War in Lebanon Beneficial?

A war in Lebanon is unlikely to heal these divisions.

Therefore, before launching such a war, Israel’s military and political leadership must be reformed to gain the legitimacy needed for this challenge.

Despite the potential benefits of eliminating the Hezbollah threat with an all-out war, such a conflict would have significant consequences and limitations.

While victory would ensure security for Israel’s northern communities and improve its strategic position, failure would leave Israel worse off than it is today.

Timing is therefore less important than ensuring victory.

Without learning from the ongoing war in Gaza and addressing its challenges, Israel risks further erosion of deterrence, economic damage, becoming a pariah state, and strained relations with Arab states. It must therefore exercise strategic patience.

Hezbollah’s day will come, but not now.

Israel should only go to war with Hezbollah after addressing current failures, stabilizing its leadership, and improving its regional and international standing.

The writer, a major general in the IDF reserves, is executive director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He was chief of the IDF Intelligence Directorate from 2018-2021.