With appreciation to Rabbi Haim Jachter for bringing the very interesting decision of the Beth Din of America to the attention of us Jewish Link readers (“A Respectful Disagreement With the Beth Din of America About a Tuition Dispute,” July 4, 2024), I, from a layman’s perspective with no knowledge of the facts other than those presented in an online summation of the beth din’s decision authored by Rabbi Itamar Rosensweig, respectfully disagree with Rabbi Jachter’s respectful disagreement with the decision concerning a tuition dispute between a yeshiva and a father of a student. But I also question the beth din’s decision. Let me explain.
This case involved a father who enrolled his son in yeshiva in Israel for shana aleph at a cost of $12,000 (reduced from the sticker price of $24,000)—an amount that was agreed upon in advance, in writing. The father then sent his son to the same yeshiva for shana bet. However, there was no written agreement as to the price; prior to shana bet, the yeshiva sent the father a form contract with a sticker price of $22,000, discounted by a $2,000 scholarship. The father refused to sign the contract and indicated that they would have to work out better financial aid. The yeshiva acknowledged this and told the father that they would follow up, but weren’t able to reach the father to follow up. At the end of the shana bet year, during which the father did not pay anything, the yeshiva claimed that it was owed the sticker price of $22,000 and the father claimed that he owed nothing. The decision of the beth din was that in the absence of an agreement as to price, based on the rule codified by the Pischei Choshen, the father should pay the yeshiva $12,000 for shana bet, based on the parties’ prior practice (i.e. the $12,000 tuition for shana alef).
Rabbi Jachter opines that the amount awarded to the yeshiva should have been the sticker price tuition of $22,000, based on the fact that the father didn’t accept the $2,000 scholarship, “so the default is the standard fee set forth by the yeshiva.” However, the father’s failure to accept the $2,000 scholarship was a technicality and if we’re going to rely on technicalities, one can make the argument that the father should not pay anything at all—since he never actually agreed to pay anything.
The beth bin’s decision that the father should pay the yeshiva $12,000 seems intuitively fair as it is a rough mid-point between the yeshiva’s claim for $22,000 and the father’s claim of zero. While the father’s claim that he should pay nothing reeks of chutzpah, the yeshiva is also to blame for having taken in a student without a price agreement. However, I question the beth din’s decision to the extent that it was based on the conclusion that in the absence of an explicit agreement, the tuition owed the yeshiva should be based on past practice, as opposed to external market custom (“Minhag Ha-Medinah”). According to the case summation, it was found that there “was no compelling clear-cut practice about the going rate for shana bet at this yeshiva or at comparable yeshivot. The evidence submitted from comparable yeshivot indicated that the actual tuition amounts vary widely based off a number of variables, including the yeshiva’s financial situation on any given year, the scholarship needs of the student’s family, the quality of the student, whether the yeshiva is looking to expand its student body, etc.” I get the fact that different yeshivot have widely varying prices for shana bet. However, given the fact that this particular yeshiva had a standard—or “sticker”—price of $22,000, wouldn’t it be expected that this yeshiva would also have a standard formula of sorts (based on various factors, like merit and financial need) to determine the bottom line tuition for any particular student? And can’t it be assumed that the $20,000 price the yeshiva in this case offered the father reflected this standard formula? If we can make these assumptions, then shouldn’t this $20,000 price be deemed in accordance with Minhag Ha-Medinah and thus the price that should be awarded the yeshiva?
And on the other hand, I question why the tuition price that the yeshiva accepted from the father for shana alef ($12,000) should be relevant to how much he should pay for shana bet. I think it is fair to say that shana alef is an experience unto itself, but shana bet is also an experience unto itself, and there is no expectation that the tuition will be unchanged. By way of analogy, the beth din presented the example of a babysitter who was paid $18 an hour on Monday and then performed babysitting services again on Wednesday—this time without an agreement—and it was determined that the babysitter should be paid $18, based on the principle of past practice. But that case was different from this case because there is no compelling reason why the price for a babysitter should be any different on Wednesday than on Monday. In contrast to the clear distinction between shana alef and shana bet.
Rabbi Jachter concluded his column by asking “What do you think?” I am taking him up on his offer and respectfully expressing my layman’s opinion. The beth din decided on $12,000 and Rabbi Jachter opined that the yeshiva should have been awarded $22,000. I vote for $20,000, based on the concept that it is the Minhag Ha-Medina for each yeshiva to have its own standard practice for determining tuition, and the yeshiva in this case presumably was relying on that standard practice when it offered $20,000.
