“The topography makes it very difficult to detect aircraft flying low and using the terrain to hide in it,” a senior researcher explains.

As tensions escalate along Israel’s northern frontier, Hezbollah’s expanding fleet of Iranian-made drones has emerged as a significant threat, testing the limits of the country’s sophisticated air defense systems.

These unmanned aerial vehicles have demonstrated an alarming ability to penetrate Israeli airspace causing destruction and casualties while often evading one of the world’s most advanced air defense networks.

While Hezbollah has suffered significant losses to many of its weapons systems, which have largely failed to make substantial impacts during the ongoing conflict, the terrorist organization’s UAV arsenal has become a real thorn in Israel’s side.

What makes these Iranian-made drones a genuine threat, and how can they be countered?

While many of Hezbollah’s weapon systems, including long-range missiles and precision munitions, have struggled to inflict significant damage on Israel, the drone array the organization received from Iran has evolved into a real threat and a major challenge for Israel.

Hezbollah has been operating drones, primarily for reconnaissance purposes, since before the Second Lebanon War in 2006. With the advancement of Iran’s unmanned vehicle program over the past two decades, Hezbollah, like other Iranian proxy organizations, has been equipped with a large number of cutting-edge Iranian-made tools for reconnaissance, attack and target destruction.

Within Hezbollah’s drone arsenal are several key players for attack and “suicide” missions, each with distinct advantages and disadvantages.

Mirsad

The UAV that struck the IDF’s Golani Infantry Brigade training base near Binyamina on Sunday evening was likely a Mirsad drone. It’s a small aircraft with an explosive warhead of about 44 pounds that can reach speeds of about 124 mph. This is a tool that Hezbollah possesses and has recently deployed more than once.

Hezbollah holds an unknown quantity of heavy and large cruise missiles of the DR3 model, originating from Russian-made Tupolev drones converted into “suicide” vehicles that can reach ranges of over 124 miles with a heavy warhead of 661 pounds. These come with significant advantages but also clear drawbacks.

The heavy drone requires a massive launcher that must be placed in a building or on a truck and can be detected relatively easily. In recent weeks, the IDF has successfully documented its destruction of several such drones hidden in civilian homes in southern Lebanon. So far, there has been no known successful launch of this weapon.

Karrar

The Karrar is an Iranian-made drone based on the American jet-powered Striker drone. The Karrar is a kind of “poor man’s fighter jet” because it combines suicide attack capabilities, bomb dropping and even air-to-air missile launches against aircraft. Its range is relatively long, and Hezbollah apparently attempted to use it during the Syrian civil war.

However, the Karrar’s jet engine and relatively high radar signature make it less effective for deep missions in Israeli territory and much more vulnerable to Israel’s anti-aircraft array.

Ababil-T

The Ababil series, named after a type of bird from Islamic folklore, is the workhorse of the Iranian drone fleet. The early models of the series served Hezbollah back in the early 2000s, and some reached the Hamas terrorist organization.

The Ababil-T is an advanced series model with an improved navigation system and an efficient and quiet internal combustion engine that is very difficult to detect by radar. The Ababil-T is agile enough to make optimal use of the Lebanese terrain and thus evade interception as it makes its way to Israel’s borders. It doesn’t need a large launcher and can be deployed from almost any terrain.

However, its relatively small range, about 75 miles, limits it to operation in areas relatively close to the border, and IDF advancement into Lebanese territory could further reduce the effective use of these drones in Israeli territory.

Shahed-136

The Shahed-136 has proven to be one of the most significant assets in Hezbollah’s drone arsenal. It has a quiet electric motor and an extremely low radar signature, making it very hard to intercept. It has a range of almost 500 miles and an armor-piercing warhead of about 18 pounds. It is relatively slow and flies at a speed of about 75 mph, a fraction of that of other suicide drones in Hezbollah’s possession.

However, its relatively simple systems give it another advantage; it’s very cheap, costing only $20,000 per unit, which means it can be held in large quantities, as Hezbollah does. It’s very easy to launch and needs only minimal ground space for deployment. All these qualities make it a perfect drone for attacking in a swarm tactic, as Hezbollah has already demonstrated.

How to counter?

It’s crucial to understand that drone and UAV warfare is an evolving form of combat that has changed almost beyond recognition in recent years and has left many armies worldwide, from Myanmar to Ukraine, grappling with significant problems and challenges.

For Israel, there are several central problems in dealing with the threat. First, drones with a low radar signature flying very close to the ground are inherently difficult to intercept, and the mountainous terrain of Southern Lebanon and the Galilee makes it even more challenging to detect and intercept these vehicles.

The second problem is that even when early detection of the vehicle occurs, the interception window is very small and sometimes simply missed entirely.

Another problem is the tactic of using a drone swarm, a large and coordinated quantity of vehicles that can arrive from several places simultaneously, “occupy” the air defense array and ensure that at least some of the vehicles will hit the target with deadly precision. Israel’s air defense array is replete with some of the world’s best detection and interception means, but even it struggles to deal with the threat.

Tal Inbar, a senior research fellow at the Virginia-based Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, explains that the defense establishment is not surprised by this: “The problem starts with topography. The terrain in Lebanon is mountainous, unlike the plain where Gaza is located. It’s carved with mountains and valleys and makes it very difficult to detect aircraft flying low and using the terrain to hide in it.”

In conclusion, Inbar says: “We don’t yet have a system that’s a game-changer.”

A possible partial solution to the threat is a return to using Vulcan cannons, which fire small shells at a tremendous rate and can be placed at many key points throughout northern Israel as a complementary part of the interception array.

Additionally, the entry of a laser system into operational service can at least partially assist in closing gaps during drone swarms and improving interception capabilities.

In Ukraine, small units of “drone hunters” on armed pickups equipped with cannons managed to inflict heavy losses on the Russian drone array, and defense systems with cannons such as the German Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun have also been successful against Russia’s Shaheds.

However, it’s important to note that even the solutions found by Ukraine represent only partial success and that only experience, coordination and learning over the years will tip the scales in favor of the defender in the battle against the drones of the Iranian axis.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.