As we begin Sanhedrin, we encounter Rabbi Yonatan (ben Yosef) of the Land of Israel arguing with Rabbi Yoshia of Babylonia. These are fifth-generation Tannaim who are students of Rabbi Yishmael. They appear together as disputants in the Mechilta and Sifrei, and several times throughout the Talmud,¹ but not in the Mishna. After all, the typical residents of the Mishnayot are Rabbi Akiva’s students, and Rabbis Yonatan and Yochanan belong to a different scholastic social network.

In all their arguments, Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya cite averse and explain how they each interpret it. Sometimes they take opposing practical positions. (For instance, in Kiddushin 10a: does the verse teach that it is the arusa or the yevama who is exempt from drinking the Sotah waters?) Other times, they agree regarding the halacha but disagree about how to derive it, saying that the other’s citation of a verse isn’t even necessary. (For instance, in Chagiga 18a, do we interpret a verse to learn that labor is prohibited on Chol Hamoed, or can it be derived from a kal vachomer?)

Sanhedrin 3a (and the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 1:1 in parallel) is an example of the latter. Everyone agrees that a court judging monetary law is composed of three judges. Rabbi Yoshiya interprets three occurrences of elohim / ha`elohim in Shemot 22:7-8, which are not references to Hashem but to judges. Rabbi Yonatan disagrees and disregards the first occurrence, stating רִאשׁוֹן תְּחִילָּה נֶאֱמַר, וְאֵין דּוֹרְשִׁין תְּחִילּוֹת. That is, the first instance is just a mention of the concept, and we don’t interpret first instances. This seemingly aligns with an Aramaic hermeneutical concept, which Rashi records as דלגופיה אתא which appears once in Keritot 6b, but which appears widely throughout the Talmud,² including in Sanhedrin 4a, as חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ or חַד קְרָא לְגוּפֵיהּ. Sometimes, the Talmudic Narrator invokes the principle, but a few times it is an Amora such as Shmuel, Rava or Rav Pappa.

Perhaps because it is so widely used, the Talmudic Narrator questions whether אֵין דּוֹרְשִׁין תְּחִילּוֹת is really under dispute. If Rabbi Yoshiya does generally interpret the first occurrence, other Tannaim might follow. He suggests that Rabbi Yoshiya agrees to the principle Rabbi Yonatan explicitly invoked. It is just that this case is exceptional, because the word hashofet could have been used instead of the stranger ha`elohim. The first instance can therefore contribute.

Tannaitic Invocation

Tannaim, Amoraim and Stammaim might have different conceptions of this hermeneutical principle, so perhaps they should be explored separately. Among Tannaitic usage, I only consider those explicitly invoked by the Tannaim themselves. If an Amora or Savora invokes רִאשׁוֹן תְּחִילָּה נֶאֱמַר to explain a Tanna’s position, this reflects on the Amora or Savora, and not necessarily that Tanna himself.

In Mechilta deRabbi Yishmael, Kaspa 5, Rabbi Yishmael (ben Elisha) notes that “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” appears thrice. These correspond to the three covenants Hashem forged with Israel, in Chorev, Arvot Moav and Har Gerizim / Eival. His student, Rabbi Yoshiya, invokes הָרִאשׁוֹן תְּחִלָּה נֶאֱמַר, so that the two instances teach that both a kosher and non-kosher animal confers ritual impurity by being carried. His other student, Rabbi Yonatan, says that this thrice-occurrence teaches a prohibition of cooking milk and meat for domesticated animals, wild animals and fowl. Chicken parmesan is thus Biblically forbidden for him. This is also contrary to the Mishna in Chullin 113a which takes גְּדִ֖י to specifically exclude wild animals and fowl. Other Tannaim there, including Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar and Rabbi Shimon, as well as the Amora Shmuel, have other explanations for this threefold occurrence.

The Mechilta demonstrates the principle being invoked by some and not others in another context than judges, implying it’s a matter of dispute. However, note the contradiction in which Tanna, of Rabbi Yonatan / Rabbi Yoshiya, applies it. If we don’t amend one text so that the Sages match, then our Talmudic Narrator already explained that everyone agrees with the principle, but he ignores it on a case-by-case basis, if the word really stands out. We’d have to suggest that גְּדִ֖י is an awkward replacement for בשר.

Amoraic Invocation

Amoraim also seem to invoke this principle in its Aramaic form. Our opening Mishna stated that the value of a piece of land dedicated to the Temple is determined by nine (even plain Israelite) judges and one kohen. In Sanhedrin 15a, first- generation Amora Shmuel notes, in Hebrew, that the word kohen appears in Vayikra 27 10 times³ discussing assessment. Continuing in a mixture of Aramaic and Hebrew,⁴ he invokes חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ, thus saying that at least one kohen is involved in the assessment, and the principle of מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט, which is one of Rabbi Yishmael’s hermeneutical principles, so that everyone else can be a mere Israelite.

This seems slightly different, in that the חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ doesn’t exactly turn it into one less, for a count of nine kohanim. This is because of the intersection with the other midrashic principle. Recall that Shmuel did not invoke חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ for milk and meat. It is also interesting that this is applied to the number of required judges.

In Yevamot 74a, a third-generation Amora from the Land of Israel who visited Bavel several times, Rabbi Yitzchak, makes a gezeira shava (verbal analogy) from the word מִמֶּנּוּ written regarding the korban Pesach and maaseir sheini. Just as someone uncircumcised may not eat of the former, he may not eat of the latter. Now, words or phrases for gezeira shava need to be “available” (mufneh) and not used for some other purpose, or else they can be refuted through logic. Rava, a fourth-generation Babylonian Amora, explains Rav Yitzchak’s approach, demonstrating that מִמֶּנּוּ was written thrice regarding korban Pesach and thrice regarding maaser sheini. For each set, one usage is for itself, לְגוּפֵיהּ. Other occurrences are to teach specific laws or for the verbal analogy.

In Ketubot 29b, Reish Lakish deduces a threefold repetition of נַעֲרָה or its variants to teach penalty payments for חַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין and חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת, but one instance is needed לְגוּפֵיהּ. Rava’s fifth-generation student Rav Pappa operates identically, except on בְּתוּלָה or its variants. Rav Chaviva, a redactor contemporary with Rav Ashi, also employs חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ. Thus, in Zevachim 3b, he notes a fourfold repetition of תוכו or תוך about the interior of earthenware vessels. One is for itself, one for a verbal analogy, and the other two for specific laws.

Stammaic Invocations

A few times, the Talmudic Narrator also invokes this principle. This doesn’t seem systematic across Talmud. There’s one explanation of derasha in Yoma 71b, explaining a brayta’s derasha based on a five-fold repetition of “linen.” Also, it’s invoked when it’s already in scope. Thus, in explaining Rabbi Shimon vs. the Sages regarding the number of walls in a sukkah, the ascribed explanation is the word sukkot spelled plene or deficiently, but one must be subtracted because of חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ. This appears in Sukkah, where it’s topical, but also in Sanhedrin 15b, shortly after Shmuel invoked the principle to a different end, and in Zevachim 38a, where Rav Chaviva had invoked it earlier in the tractice. Similarly, the Talmudic Narrator invokes it twice in Zevachim 55b, where it’s in scope.

Also, the Talmudic Narrator often raises it as an objection, in the form of מיבעי ליה לגופיהb⁵, as an objection to a proposed derasha by a Tanna or an Amora. Many of these are in Sanhedrin and Zevachim, but there are other instances across the Talmud as well. The objection is typically overcome by finding another occurrence, or by stating that a different aspect of the word, such as the definite article, is what is being interpreted.

Sometimes the underlying derasha involves repetition of a word; other times, it doesn’t, so the invocation seems like an extension of the core idea. For instance, in Yevamot 13b, Reish Lakish interprets לֹא תִתְגּוֹדְדוּ as prohibiting factions in reading the Megillah on different days, and the Talmudic Narrator objects that it comes for its own law, prohibiting cutting for the dead. Or in Chullin 82a, where the derasha is on the plural תשחטו. Maybe these derashot, seemingly ignoring לְגוּפֵיהּ,demonstrate that אֵין דּוֹרְשִׁין תְּחִילּוֹת isn’t universally accepted. Still, we see this principle used by Tannaim, Amoraim and the Talmudic Narrator, so it makes sense to defend it as an uncontested principle.

Rabbi Dr. Joshua Waxman teaches computer science at Stern College for Women, and his research includes programmatically finding scholars and scholastic relationships in the Babylonian Talmud.

1 Namely, Yoma 57b; Chagiga 18a; Nazir 6b, 39b; Kiddushin 10a; Sotah 24a, 46b; Bava Metzia 54a, 94b; Bava Batra 117a; Sanhedrin 3b, 15b; and Menachot 90b.

2 Namely, Yoma 71a; Sukkah 6b twice which is repeated in Zevachim 38a and again repeated twice in Sanhedrin 4a; Shmuel in Megillah 23b and repeated in Sanhedrin 15a; Rava citing Rabbi Yitzchak in Yevamot 74a twice; Reish Lakish and Rav Pappa each once in Ketubot 29b; Rav Chaviva the Redactor in Zevachim 3b; the Talmudic Narrator twice in Zevachim 55b;

3 Actually 11, but ten with hakohen. The penultimate lakohen is presumably not counted.

4 Transitioning to a different language sometimes indicates that the Talmudic Narrator is filling in the reasoning. If so, maybe he’s only invoking מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט and not חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ.

5 Namely, Rosh Hashanah 13b; Yoma 4a, 27a, 33a and b; Yevamot 13b, 68b; Sanhedrin 13b; Zevachim 51a, 62b, 89a; Menachot 9b; and Chullin 82b.