I. Golem and Minyan
We are witnessing a major transformation of information and technology with the growth of artificial intelligence (AI). To my frustration, much of the Jewish discourse on AI begins—and often ends—with the halachic status of a golem. A golem is an often-discussed literary creature that is made by a pious Torah scholar through kabbalistic means. In the late 17th century, Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (known as the Chacham Tzvi) asked whether a golem can be counted for a minyan— a prayer quorum (Responsa Chacham Tzvi, no. 93). His analysis and the subsequent literature is often cited in the context of contemporary AI. While this analogy may seem strained—after all, a golem is a physical construct created by mystical means, while AI is code—it points to something deeper: our tradition’s attempt to grapple with beings that fall outside standard halachic categories. And this, I believe, is a much more serious and necessary conversation.
Perhaps my original frustration lies with the Chacham Tzvi’s initial question. Of course a golem cannot count for a minyan. It isn’t a person and certainly isn’t a Jew. What is the question? While his conclusion is that you cannot count a golem for a minyan, his reasoning is hardly rigorous. On the one hand, since the actions and good deeds of the righteous are like their children (Rashi, Gen. 3:9), a golem that was created and raised by a righteous person is like the person’s child. On the other hand, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 65b) says that R. Zeira created a golem and then destroyed it. From the fact that R. Zeira could “kill” a golem, we see that it is not truly alive (Responsa Chacham Tzvi, no. 93). All of these arguments emerge from an analysis of aggadic passages that need not be taken literally. This seems like an interesting intellectual exercise rather than a careful, serious halachic analysis.
Later scholars take this further, asking questions such as, if a golem slaughters an animal, is it kosher (Darkei Teshuvah 7:11)? Does a dead golem’s corpse convey ritual impurity (Sidrei Taharos, Ohalos 5a)? May one eat a golem animal’s meat together with milk (Malbim, Gen. 18:8)? If a golem finds a lost object, may he keep it or must he give it to his creator (Chashukei Chemed, Sanhedrin 65b)? As an intellectual exercise, this is all very stimulating. Indeed, an important part of the Talmudic method consists of exploring unusual, extreme cases to test the boundaries of the law. But are we supposed to take all this discussion of a golem seriously? No one alive has ever seen a golem and none of the arguments in any direction meet the standards of normal halachic argumentation. (These examples are taken from R. Yosie Levine, “Hacham Tsevi Ashkenazi and the Battleground of the Early Modern Rabbinate,” pp. 188-192, and R. J. David Bleich, Jewish Law and Contemporary Issues, pp. 373-382.)
II. Unclassified Beings
The answer, I believe, is that this is an immensely important conversation for developing a comprehensive Torah worldview. The question at hand is not what the status may be of a golem or an AI. The question is much bigger: How do we live in a world with beings that are not bound by any ethical framework? Imagine there was a whole class of beings who fall into no halachic category. How would we relate to them? What would we expect of them? Would we be allowed to lie to them, steal from them and even kill them without consequence? That seems hard to accept. Would the laws of forbidden relationships, or even assault, apply to their females? Presumably they would apply because any answer to the contrary would lead to absurd results. The question, then, is why. What category applies to such unnatural beings? The stakes are high because at the rate that technology seems to be advancing this minor curiosity will soon become a widespread reality.
The Midrash says that Yosef told his father that his brothers were, among other things, eating from live animals and acting improperly with girls (Rashi, Gen. 37:2). Rav Yeshayahu Horowitz (Shelah; 17th c., Germany) asks how the brothers could have acted so improperly and contrary to Jewish law. He answers that the animals and girls were created through kabbalah but Yosef did not realize that this was the case. In other words, unnaturally created beings do not have the same rights and protections as those naturally born. If generalized, this opinion on this limited circumstance would imply that it would be perfectly moral to assault a life-like female robot. That seems an unlikely conclusion.
Rav Elchanan Wasserman (20th c., Belarus) quotes earlier sources that say that in the times of Mashiach, there will be a resurrection of the deceased righteous in advance of the general resurrection before the Judgment Day. He suggests that those who are resurrected will not be obligated in the Torah’s commandments since the Gemara (Shabbos 30a) says, “Once someone dies, he cannot fulfill Torah and mitzvos” (Kovetz Shi’urim, vol. 2, no. 29). The Jews who are alive naturally will have to fulfill all the mitzvos, while those who are resurrected, including Moshe and Aharon, will be exempt from all commandments. We will live side by side with righteous Jews who do not have to hear shofar, sit in the sukkah, eat matzah, etc. Rav Wasserman does not discuss whether they are also exempt from prohibitions. Are they allowed to steal, kill, marry siblings? Will Moshe and Aharon be free to eat a cheeseburger? It seems hard to imagine. I think I can make a strong argument that they will be bound by the prohibitions but that is part of the broader discussion. Namely, what religious or ethical guidelines apply to creatures that are not typical beings?
III. What Is a Golem?
It is hard to classify a golem as a person. Rav Shmuel Edels (Maharsha; 17th c., Poland) proves this from a golem’s inability to speak (Chiddushei Aggados, Sanhedrin 65b). But even setting aside the issue of speech, a golem lacks a soul (Rav Yehudah Aszod, Responsa Yehudah Ya’aleh, Orach Chaim, no. 26). However, as a reasoning being, perhaps it is bound by the Noahide laws. Rav Nissim Gaon (11th c., Tunisia) argues that some laws are intuitive and therefore binding without a command. These include the laws required to maintain civil order, such as a prohibition against murder and theft. An argument can be made that a golem and an AI are theologically bound by those natural, rational laws. Likewise, other people are bound by a prohibition against harming these non-human beings because without such a prohibition, society would become chaotic and immorality would reign.
These are just the preliminary thoughts of a junior scholar. The more important point is that we do not necessarily have strictly halachic tools to discuss the status of these unnatural beings. Therefore, we need to access our aggadic tools. By exploring our midrashic, homiletical and philosophical texts, we can find analogies and theories that help us find the right categories and approaches to apply to these unusual situations. The golem analogy is incomplete but it helps us ask the right questions and points us in the direction of possible answers.
Rabbi Gil Student is the editor of TorahMusings.com. His latest book, Articles of Faith: Traditional Jewish Belief in the Internet Era, is available online and in bookstores near you.
