I. AI Authorship
Is it permissible to study Torah from a sefer— a text of Torah scholarship — written by artificial intelligence (AI)? There are different ways an AI could author a sefer. For our purposes, we can divide authorship in Torah literature into four main forms:
1) Summarizing Existing Texts: This includes abridgments, digests or restatements of material found in classical texts and commentaries. For example, an AI could create a Kitzur Abarbanel, a concise commentary on the Torah summarizing Abarbanel’s lengthy commentary.
2) Consolidating Decisions: It is common nowadays for authors to collect different rulings on a specific topic and make this into a text. There are volumes on the laws of blessings, the second day of Yom Tov, sending away a mother bird and much more. This kind of authorship involves significant judgment in selection and organization but often, albeit with important exceptions, does not involve much originality. An AI can consolidate existing rulings on any topic from a vast database of responsa and commentaries.
3) Connecting Texts: Torah is a web of interconnected ideas, and great Torah works often draw connections between sources. For example, a running commentary on the Ein Yaakov could quote other passages with similar language and, based on these two side-by-side texts, suggest an interpretation that connects these passages. This involves broad knowledge of texts and the ability to create an original interpretation based on the different texts.
4) Presenting Original Analysis: The hallmark of Torah creativity is chidush— innovative interpretations. Whether in Jewish law or thought, the author in this case offers a novel interpretation or argument based on rigorous thinking and comparative study. AI can be trained on the chidushim literature and learn the different methodologies of interpretation. Maybe not today, but perhaps someday, an AI could write an entirely new commentary or sefer with chidushim.
Already today, the technology probably exists for AI to perform within the first two of these modes. With the proper prompting and training, it can summarize and consolidate texts and opinions. In the near future, AI likely will also be able to juxtapose differing opinions, draw connections across vast literatures and even offer novel insights. Even if these are just mechanical reorganizations of data and following established methodologies, the result would be a sefer indistinguishable from the many sefarim we see on bookstore shelves. AI may produce Torah content, but is it actually Torah?
II. Inappropriate Teachers
The concern that emerges most forcefully in this context is whether studying from such a work constitutes learning Torah from an inappropriate teacher, a rav she-eino hagun. The Gemara (Chagigah 15b) tells the story of R. Meir learning Torah from Elisha ben Avuyah, known as Acher, who went astray:
”And how could R. Meir learn Torah from Acher? Didn’t Rabbah bar bar Chanah say in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: ‘What is the meaning of the verse: “For the priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek Torah from his mouth; for he is an angel of the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:7)? If the teacher is similar to a heavenly angel, seek Torah from him; but if not, do not seek Torah from him.’ [R. Meir found another verse to justify it…] Do not the verses contradict each other? This is not difficult: one verse is about a senior (gadol) and the other is about a junior (katan).”
One reason offered for this prohibition against learning from an improper teacher is that you might learn from his improper behavior. Rashi (ad loc., s.v. gadol) says that the exception mentioned in the Gemara for a senior is because he will know to be careful to avoid learning from the teacher’s behavior. Tosafos (Ta’anis 7a s.v. im) explain likewise. Rav Tzadok HaKohen Rabinowitz (19th c., Poland) offers an alternative view. He says that when you learn Torah from a teacher, you have to feel as if the teachings come from divine sources (Resisei Lailah, p. 52, no. 34, quoted in R. Moshe Zuriel, Leket Peirushei Aggadah, Chagigah 15b). According to R. Tzadok, the Torah teachings of an inappropriate teacher lack this extra level. The first view believes that a Torah teacher must not lack a base level of observance. The second view believes that a Torah teacher requires an extra level.
These views have practical implications regarding AI. According to the first approach, the issue is imitation of bad actions. In that respect, AI is not a human being—it has no character, no deeds and no personality to emulate. An AI does not have the lacking that an inappropriate teacher has. But according to the second approach, that a Torah teacher requires an extra level, an AI does not rise to it. An AI is not holy like an angel and does not teach Torah as part of the traditional chain of transmission. Therefore, if we follow the first approach, we would have no problem studying Torah that is taught by an AI. But if we follow the second approach, an AI would not be an appropriate Torah teacher.
III. The Written Word
An additional consideration is whether the prohibition of learning from an inappropriate teacher applies even to writings. Rav Shabsai Cohen (the Shach; 17th c., Poland) asks why Rambam does not quote the distinction in the above Gemara between a senior (gadol) and a junior (katan). He suggests either that nowadays everyone is on a lower level and considered a katan or that this distinction belongs to R. Meir while we follow the Sages who disagree with him (Shach, Yoreh De’ah 246:8). Rav Avraham de Boton (16th c., Turkey) had already pointed out that we cannot say that Rambam was speaking of contemporary times when we are all juniors, because Rambam wrote for all times, even including laws that we cannot observe today. Rather, he concludes, Rambam must have ruled against R. Meir (Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:1).
Rav Yirmiyahu Loew (19th c., Hungary) argues that it is difficult to say that Rambam rules against R. Meir because Rambam himself studied works of idolatry and heresy (Divrei Yirmiyahu, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:1). Indeed, Rav Yitzchak Bar Sheishes (15th c., Algeria) suggests that Rambam must have considered himself a senior in order to allow himself to study inappropriate material (Responsa Rivash, no. 45). Rav Loew explains that there is a difference between studying directly from someone and studying from his writings. A mature reader, someone senior, can reflect critically on the writings and accept the good while rejecting the bad. He is much less subject to the charisma of the speaker. Rav Yosef Zechariah Stern (19th c., Lithuania) rules similarly (Responsa Zeicher Yehosef, Yoreh De’ah, no. 173), as does Rav Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer (19th c., Hungary; Kesav Sofer Al Ha-Torah, 1995 edition, p. 493). Rav Yehudah Loewe (Maharal; 16th c., Czech.) writes similarly regarding studying secular subjects from books (Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ha-Torah, ch. 14). However, Rav Aharon Aryeh Katz (cont., Israel) writes that many contemporary authorities rule strictly and forbid reading books by inappropriate teachers (Pesakim U-Teshuvos, Yoreh De’ah 246:30).
According to the view that you may not learn from an inappropriate teacher because you might follow his bad ways, this would not apply to an AI. Even according to the view that a teacher must be part of the chain of tradition, which an AI is not, many authorities allow a senior— a well-trained adult— to learn from such a teacher or at least from a sefer written by such a teacher. It would seem that there is room within Halacha for a sefer written by AI, even one containing chidushim, provided it is reviewed by senior scholars and given approbations asserting to its beneficial content.
Rabbi Gil Student is the editor of TorahMusings.com. His latest book, Articles of Faith: Traditional Jewish Belief in the Internet Era, is available online and in bookstores near you.
