The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) raises new and sometimes unexpected halachic questions. Among them is whether it is permissible to teach Torah to an AI. On the one hand, what could be wrong with it? After all, it is like saving a Torah text on a hard drive. To understand the question, consider a humanoid robot sitting down with you and learning Gemara as your chavrusa. You read the text together, argue about its meaning, debate possible explanations. Is that permissible?
I. Two Reasons Not to Teach
The Gemara (Chagigah 13a) states that a Jew may not teach Torah to a gentile. The exact parameters of the prohibition—which content and circumstances fall under this prohibition and which do not—are important but outside the scope of this discussion. Let us discuss whatever content and circumstances that are forbidden. Tosafos (ad loc., s.v. ein) ask that this passage sounds like there is a prohibition for a Jew to teach Torah to a gentile, while another Gemara (Sanhedrin 59a) states that a Jew violates lifnei iveir (enabling another to sin) by teaching Torah to a gentile. In other words, the Gemara in Chagigah seems to say that the primary prohibition is on a Jew not to teach Torah to outsiders while the Gemara in Sanhedrin says that the primary prohibition is on a gentile not to learn Torah.
The reasoning for the prohibition against teaching is that the Torah is the heritage of the Jewish people. When we teach it to others, we give away our unique heritage. When a gentile studies the Torah that was given to the Jewish people, he takes from us something that is precious. Is the prohibition on Jews not to give away part of our heritage or on gentiles not to take it?
With that framing, we can understand the AI question. If a Jew is prohibited from teaching Torah to someone outside the Jewish community, then that may very well apply also to AI. We are giving away our heritage to artificial intelligence. But if the prohibition falls on a gentile not to take our heritage, an AI presumably is not bound by that prohibition. We are suggesting that if the prohibition falls on Jews, then we may not teach Torah to AI. If the prohibition falls on gentiles, and only indirectly through lifnei iveir on Jews, then we are allowed to teach Torah to AI.
Ultimately, Tosafos answer that both sides are correct—Jews are forbidden to teach Torah to outsiders and gentiles are forbidden to learn Torah (within specific parameters). But from the perspective of a Jew, the teaching is prohibited both inherently and because of lifnei iveir. Therefore, even when lifnei iveir does not apply, such as when other teachers are available, the inherent prohibition still applies. Based on Tosafos’ approach, it would seem that we are not allowed to teach Torah to AI. We may not sit down with a robot chavrusa. And if it applies to a humanoid AI, presumably it also applies to an AI website or app, like ChatGPT. Why would the robotic body form make a difference?
II. Reasons to Teach
However, Rambam takes an entirely different approach. Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Melachim 10:9) states that a gentile may not create a new religious practice that he performs as a mitzvah. He is allowed to shake a lulav out of curiosity but not out of a sense of religious obligation. There is, however, a middle ground between these two intents: fulfilling an optional mitzvah. A gentile is allowed to shake a lulav as an optional mitzvah, a chosen way to reach out to God. However, observing Shabbos and learning Torah are exceptions to this permission because they represent Jewish uniqueness.
As Tosafos understand the matter, gentiles may not learn Torah because such study is an element of Jewish identity. According to Rambam, they may not learn Torah because it is a Jewish act of devotion reserved only for members of the faith. The practical difference between these two reasons is when a gentile learns Torah out of intellectual curiosity. This should be allowed according to Rambam but not Tosafos. AI never intends to learn information as a religious obligation. It would only learn Torah to help the person asking for assistance or to acquire knowledge. Therefore, it would seem that according to Rambam, it would be permissible to learn Torah with an AI chavrusa.
Rav Shmuel Eidels (17th c., Poland) writes that the prohibition only applies to the “secrets” of the Torah (Chiddushei Aggados, Chagigah, ad loc.). According to this approach, we are allowed to teach basic texts and laws to gentiles but not the deep meanings and reasons for the Torah’s laws. Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, the Netziv(19th c., Russia) says that this means learning in an iyun style— in depth and conceptually (Meromei Sadeh, Chagigah, ad loc.). Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (20th c., Germany-Switzerland) expands on this approach (Seridei Esh, Yoreh De’ah 55-56 [in old editions 1:174, 2:11]). While this might help us a bit, often the learning we exchange with AI is on an in-depth, iyun level. If you merely upload an essay, Rav Weinberg would consider that permissible, because it is considered like a college lecture. But if you learn with a robot chavrusa, you are likely learning iyun with him, which would be problematic.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (20th c., U.S.) writes that the prohibition only applies when your intent is to teach Torah to a gentile (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De’ah, vol. 2 no. 132). If there is a gentile at your Passover seder, you are allowed to read the Haggadah and discuss the Exodus miracles in detail because your intent is to study for yourself and with the Jews in attendance. Perhaps that also applies when you learn with an AI chavrusa. Your intent is to understand the material better and the AI is a tool to help you accomplish that. You do not care whether the AI understands it or not. It seems that according to Rav Feinstein, this would be permissible.
As the halachic issues with AI become more pronounced, leading authorities will begin to weigh in on these types of questions. For now, we can tentatively suggest that it is permissible to teach Torah to, and learn Torah with, an AI because your intent is for your own learning and benefit.
Rabbi Gil Student is the publisher and editor-in-chief of TorahMusings.com. He writes frequently in Jewish newspapers and magazines, serving as a regular contributor to Jewish Action, The Jewish Link of New Jersey, The Jewish Echo and The Vues. Rabbi Student serves on the executive committee of the Rabbinical Council of America, on the editorial board of the Orthodox Union’s Jewish Action magazine and as the magazine’s book editor.
