A Smart Question

A young member of Shaarei Orah and a TABC student asked if they could drive for Uber Eats. This job would involve delivering non-kosher food directly to the homes of customers. While there is room to be lenient in need, I advised these young men to be strict.

Sechora B’Ma’achalot Asurot

The halacha (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 117) prohibits sechora b’ma’achalot asurot, engaging in commercial activity with non-kosher food prohibited on a Torah level. Uber Eats drivers are employed to deliver non-kosher food and appear to violate this rule.

The Rishonim and Acharonim actively debate as to whether this is a Torah- or rabbinic-level prohibition. The Kaf HaChaim (Yoreh De’ah 117:1) rules that it is a Torah-level prohibition, and this seems to constitute the widely accepted opinion (as stated by Rav Moshe Shternbuch, Teshuvot V’Hanhagot 1:429).

Nonetheless, Rav Ovadia Yosef (Kaf HaChaim, Yoreh De’ah 117:56; Chacham Ovadia completed, at the request of the family of the Kaf HaChaim, this sefer until Yoreh De’ah 119, after the author died while writing on Yoreh De’ah 117) writes that we consider the opinions that only a rabbinic prohibition is involved, in case of great need.

Poskim debate whether the ban applies only to the owner of a business or even to an employee. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Kaf HaChaim, Yoreh De’ah 117:72) summarizes the opinions and concludes that baseline halacha follows the lenient view. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe, Yoreh De’ah 51) explicitly permits transporting non-kosher items.

There is especially room to be lenient since the Rashba (Teshuvot 3:223) writes that the prohibition to engage in business with non-kosher food is due to concern that one may eat it. However, this concern hardly applies to an Uber Eats driver who jeopardizes his job if he eats the delivered food.

Nonetheless, I heard that customers occasionally grant permission to the driver to eat some of the provided food. Thus, the Rashba’s concern might very well turn out to be relevant to the Uber Eats driver.

Rav Ovadia Yosef (Kaf HaChaim, Yoreh De’ah 117:79) summarizes the debate whether our prohibition applies even when there is no concern for eating the food. He concludes that one may be lenient in case of need but that it is preferable to avoid doing so if possible.

The young men who posed this question (baruch Hashem) are not experiencing financial distress. Therefore, they should follow strict opinions since most poskim agree that we are dealing with a Torah-level prohibition.

Benefiting From Milk and Meat

Another halachic concern about delivering non-kosher food is the prohibition against deriving benefit from meat and milk cooked together. While there is room to be lenient, it is better (absent a case of great need) to be strict.

There is considerable debate whether it is forbidden to derive benefit from a mixture of milk and meat from kosher animals not slaughtered following halachic standards (nevelot). In his commentary to the Mishnah (Keritut 3:4), Rambam writes that nevelot cannot be assigned the additional prohibition of a forbidden mixture of milk and meat (ein issur chal al issur). This question is not merely an academic issue because a Jew is permitted to benefit from (though it is forbidden to eat) improperly slaughtered meat but cannot benefit from a mixture of milk and meat. For example, suppose we accept Rambam’s opinion as normative. In that case, one may feed an animal commercial pet food that contains a mixture of milk and meat since the meat ingredients are most likely nevela. However, since many authorities do not accept Rambam’s view as normative, it is best to avoid relying on this leniency, especially since there is potential for biblical violations (Dagul Merevavah, Yoreh De’ah 87:3).

Lifnei Iver Lo Titen Michshol

The Torah (Vayikra 19:14) prohibits causing another to sin—lifnei iver lo titen michshol. Delivering non-kosher food to Jewish customers seems to violate this Torah-level prohibition. Once again, while there is room to be lenient in considerable need, it is best to be strict.

The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 6b) teaches that lifnei iver lo titein michshol applies only if the violator would have considerable difficulty in sinning without the facilitator’s assistance. This category is referred to as trei avri d’nahara, literally where one brings the forbidden item to another from one side of a river. We do not define our case as trei avri d’nahara, since if the young men decline the job, many others are ready to take it.

However, some opinions (such as Tosafot Shabbat 3a s.v. Bava; in contrast with Tosafot in Avoda Zara 6b, s.v. Minayin) rule that even in such a case there is a rabbinic obligation to separate one’s fellow Jew from sinning (l’afrushei me’issura). The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 151:1) rules that while those who follow the lenient approach have halachic support, it is better to satisfy the stringent opinion. Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechave Da’at 3:38, citing Rav Yehuda Ayash, Teshuvot Bet Yehuda 1: Yoreh De’ah 12 and Rav Yitzhak Tai’eb Erech HaShulchan Choshen Mishpat 34:12) subscribes to this approach as well, especially when facilitating a Torah-level prohibition.

Conclusion:
Not Worth Being Lenient

Although there is room to be lenient in case of great need, I advised the two young inquirers to avoid delivering non-kosher food for Uber Eats. Such work is just not worth the risk of violating three Torah-level prohibitions. Bottom line, it is less than ideal for young Jewish men in their formative years to be involved with delivering non-kosher food, especially since some of their customers will be Jews.

Rabbi Haim Jachter is the spiritual leader of Congregation Shaarei Orah, the Sephardic Congregation of Teaneck. He also serves as a rebbe at Torah Academy of Bergen County and a dayan on the Beth Din of Elizabeth.