Rav Shizvi makes what seems like a ridiculous statement, and his colleagues laugh at him. Rava—his disputant—comes to Rav Shizvi’s defense. Let’s examine this exchange, in Gittin 55a.
As background, say a thief stole something. Does the prior owner’s realization and abandonment of hope (yeiush) suffice to transfer the item to the thief’s legal possession—as a matter of biblical law—or must there also be a change in the item, either a transformation of the object itself or a sale to a third party?
Rava brought as evidence a mishna (Bava Kamma 74a) about a thief who stole an animal and then consecrated it. The thief did not then hand the animal over to the Temple, but slaughtered or sold it—which would be a change. Usually, this would trigger a fourfold or fivefold payment, depending if it were a sheep or cow, but here, he is only liable to a double payment. The implication is that the consecration took effect, which should only be true if the thief already owned the animal by biblical law. Further, a baraita designed to expand upon the mishna declares that, were the thief to instead sacrifice this consecrated animal outside the Temple, he would be liable to karet—divine cutting-off, something which surely indicates the consecration works biblically, and that his ownership is a matter of biblical law.
To this, Rav Shizvi said: “It is rabbinic karet, כָּרֵת מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם!” Those in attendance laughed at him. Rava then leaped to Rav Shizvi’s defense: “A great man has spoken, do not laugh at him! “He means that karet will apply to the thief as a result of their words. Because they have legally placed the animal in the thief’s possession (by virtue of hefker beit din hefker), it is biblically in the thief’s possession, thus incurring the biblical divine punishment. Rava, thus, darshens Rav Shizbi’s speech in the same manner that Chazal does to pesukim, and the same manner that Rava (versus Abaye) does to Tannaitic sources, by interpreting it hyper-literally. מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם doesn’t mean “on a rabbinic level,” but “as a result of their words.”
Other Sugyot
Several other sugyot may shed light on this exchange. While Rava and Rav Shizvi—fourth-generation Babylonian Amoraim—discussed this point here, an important parallel sugya is Bava Kamma 68b, where second-generation Amoraim of Israel argue the same. Rabbi Yochanan maintains that yeiush alone will transfer to the thief’s possession, and Reish Lakish disagrees. Rabbi Yochanan musters up the selfsame mishna to prove his point. Reish Lakish reinterprets the mishna so that when it states גָּנַב וְהִקְדִּישׁ, the thief stole and the original owner consecrates. That could have been a handy response to Rava. Rava often aligns with Rabbi Yochanan.
Rava’s reaction is one of menschlichkeit and intellectual honesty. Even though Rav Shizvi had opposed him, he came to Rav Shizvi’s defense and found a way to make his answer work. This is consistent with Rava’s character in Bava Metzia 22a, in the sugya of “yeiush shelo midaat,” where, shortly before conclusively losing to Abaye, he comes to Abaye’s defense in how to interpret a baraita.
The Rav Chisda Angle
I would assume that peshat in Rav Shizvi’s words is that the karet is actually rabbinic. The mishna on Gittin 59a records a dispute: if a cheresh, shoteh or kattan finds a lost item, the Tanna Kamma maintains that taking it away from them is considered theft because of tikkun olam, implying a rabbinic level. Rabbi Yossi says that it is absolute theft, gezel gamur. To this, Rav Chisda says (Gittin 61a) that it is גָּזֵל גָּמוּר מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם, rabbinic absolute theft.
Assuming that there’s just a single, fourth-generation Rav Shizvi1, he seems to be a student of Rav Chisda, for he cites Rav Chisda in Shabbat 136b, Yevamot 83b and Eruvin 80b and 81b. In Shabbat 23b, Rav Chisda frequents Rav Shizvi’s father’s home, and saw that he would kindle many lights in honor of Shabbat. Rav Chisda declared, “a great person will emerge from here,” and, sure enough, Rav Shizvi was born. In Shabbat 120a, Rava says that Rav Shizvi misled Rav Chisda in a matter of halacha. (Recall that Rava was also Rav Chisda’s student/son-in-law.) Perhaps, Rav Shizvi is echoing Rav Chisda’s language, and concepts, but in the karet rather than theft realm.
Finally, there is a fundamental dispute between Rabba and Rav Chisda in Yevamot 89b. Rav Chisda maintains that rabbinic law has standing even on a biblical level, such that it “uproots” biblical law. Thus, for instance, a rabbinically-declared mamzer is permitted to marry a biblical mamzeret. Rabba disagrees, for rabbinic law is on a separate stratum. Rabba must reinterpret certain Tannaitic prooftexts, or otherwise explain how it works. For instance, for an inheritance case, Rabba can invoke “hefker beit din hefker.” For Rav Chisda, a baraita declares that a rabbinically invalidating sacrifice doesn’t effect atonement, implying that one would subsequently bring another animal as a sacrifice, despite it not being required on a biblical level, and, thus, chullin. For Rabba, this simply means that one doesn’t consume it. Rabba also invokes a far-reaching exception that the rabbis can, indeed, demand inaction in fulfillment of a biblical law.
Might Rav Shizvi be channeling Rav Chisda in asserting that karet works on a rabbinic level? His laughing colleagues may be in Pumbedita, where the operating assumption is like Rabba. Since Rava also accepts Rabba’s framework, he makes Rav Shizvi’s suggestion work by following the Rabba playbook and invoking “hefker beit din hefker.”
Rabbi Dr. Joshua Waxman teaches computer science at Stern College for Women, and his research includes programmatically finding scholars and scholastic relationships in the Babylonian Talmud.
1 Based on people and types of interactions, Rav Aharon Hyman claims that there’s Rav Shizvi I and II.
