“Really? There are halachos about moving? You cannot be serious, rabbi.”
Well, we are serious and during moving day, there is a little-known halacha that, very often, does apply. But first, a short introduction. There are, generally speaking, always two ways to move:
One can hire movers, at a total cost of about $4,000-$5,000.
Or one can rent a truck ($100 at the local Chasidish-owned Penske truck rental 718-474-7200) and then hire workers across from Seasons Express ($18 per hour for 12 hours times four people)—at a total cost of $1,000.
Usually, if one opts for the second choice—one should provide them with lunch—and here is where the little-known halacha comes in.
When you are moving, you are not going to cook up some mac and cheese. You can drive them to pick up food, and generally speaking, they are going to opt for the local Popeyes or order Uber Eats—not the takeout section of Seasons Express. Most people offer to pay for lunch, but if you do, you have to give them the cash—do not give them your credit card or put it on your credit card somehow. The reason for this (aside for theft concerns) is that when it goes on your credit card—it is you that is the one making the transaction—with non-kosher food, and that is a halachic problem, as discussed in siman 117 in the Yoreh Deah section of Shulchan Aruch.
The Name of the Prohibition
The name of the prohibition is, “Sechora b’maachalos asuros,” and it is found in both the mishna in Shviis, in the Gemara in Pesachim 23a—where the pasuk in Vayikra (11:11) is understood to prohibit having anything to do with that which is non-kosher, “And they shall be an abomination for you. You shall not eat of their flesh, and their dead bodies you shall hold in abomination.”
The Debate as to Its Origin
Indeed, the Baalei Tosfos (Pesachim 23a, “Amar”) hold that it is a full-blown Torah prohibition. The Trumas HaDeshen (Siman 200), however, cites the Gilyon Tosfos that the citation of the pasuk is merely an “asmachta”—generally understood as a biblical allusion to a future rabbinic enactment.
The Rashba (Responsum Volume III, siman 223) explains that the reason for the prohibition is so that one does not come to eat from it accidentally himself. Even though the phraseology of the Rashba seems to indicate that it is of rabbinic origin, the Taz does rule that even the Rashba holds that it is a Torah prohibition.
What the Prohibition Applies To
What is the halacha if we are unsure as to whether the food item is forbidden by actual Torah law? It seems that the poskim hold that the prohibition still applies (see Mishneh LaMelech Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 8:18 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger responsum no. 74) and the Beis Meir (beginning of siman 117).
What about fruits that got wormy? The Pischei Teshuva (Yoreh Deah 117:2) cites views that forbid it since the fruits are forbidden to consume. There is a large body of poskim with a dissenting opinion cited in Darchei Teshuva (117:6). The Pri Megadim questions how they could dissent since the entire reason is that one may come to consume it and that certainly applies with worky fruit.
The Shulchan Aruch rules that the prohibition is limited to non-kosher items whose main purpose is for food consumption. This is based on a Yerushalmi in Shviis (7:7) which states that one is permitted to raise donkeys and camels if one is doing so for the labor that they perform. Based upon this, Rabbeinu Tam ruled (Bava Kamma 82b, “lo yigdal”) that one is permitted to raise donkeys for the purpose of tanning hides with their fat.
The Bais Yosef and the Shach, however, both cite the dissenting view of the Rashba (responsum Volume III, Siman 223) who forbids it.
There are certain animal fats called “chailev” the consumption of which involves a punishment of kares. There is a debate among the poskim as to the disposition of doing business with these fats (see Shevet HaLevi (Volume VI, siman 113) for a full discussion of this. The reason why chailev may be more lenient is because there is a pasuk in the Torah Vayikrah 7:24) that seems to specifically permit doing business with it. The Darchei Teshuva (117:34) writes that since the main use of chailev in contemporary times is solely for work purposes and not for food, it is permitted according to all opinions.
Rav Aharon Felder, zt”l, in his Rishumei Aharon (Volume I, 117:5) cites the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein that one would be permitted in doing business in horse hair.
If the Food Could Once Have Been Kosher
The Pischei Teshuva (Yoreh Deah 117:6) cites a possible debate between the Chavas Yair and the Chasam Sofer as to whether there is a biblical prohibition of doing business with food that once had a time of its possibly being kosher. All chicken—kosher or not—would have had a time where it could have been kosher. Thus, in the aforementioned case where the Popeye food was placed on a Jewish man’s credit card, the Chavas Yair would hold that only a rabbinic prohibition was violated, while the Chasam Sofer may hold that a Torah prohibition was violated.
What difference does it make whether it could once have been kosher? One may ask as to what difference it would make whether it once could have been kosher or not—since, at the end of the day, it would still be forbidden by rabbinic law?
The answer—believe it or not—lies in whether or not there is an obligation to do teshuva on an accidental violation (shogeg) of a rabbinic law. Rav Yaakov Lorberbaum, zt”l, in his Nesivos HaMishpat (Choshen Mishpat 243:3) writes that there is no need for atonement. The Mishna Berura (334:76), however, disagrees and cites the view of the Eliyah Rabbah (334:26) that it definitely requires atonement.
And Speaking of Atonement
And speaking of atonement, this author would like to ask forgiveness from the hardworking neighbor who worked all day moving only to be subjected to a discussion of the halachos dealt with above. May they have nachas, bracha and success in their new abode. We will certainly miss them.
The author can be reached at yairhoffman2@gmail.com
