May these words of Torah serve as a merit le’iluy nishmat Meira Chaya Nechama Beracha, a”h, bat David Mordechai, sheyichye
Should a husband violate the laws of muktzah to prevent his wife from violating a biblical law on Shabbos?
The words of the commentators on our daf might shed light to a question that could confront a husband in Israel who is becoming more observant of Torah law while his wife has not yet accepted upon herself the ways of our tradition. Imagine that the baby of the couple develops a slightly higher fever than usual on a Shabbos. The loving mother takes the temperature of the baby and realizes that it is higher than normal. She panics and decides to immediately flag a cab and take the child to the hospital. The husband tells her that the baby is not deathly ill, they should not violate Shabbos, and they should wait until Shabbos is over to bring the baby to the doctor. The wife gets very upset and says that she will take the baby against the wishes of the father. The father now has a dilemma. Should he put money in his pocket and tell his wife, “You are right. I will flag a cab, pay with the money and take the baby to the hospital now”? He could then go down with the baby, pretend to seek a cab and really go to a beis midrash to learn until after Shabbos, at which time he will take the baby to the clinic. Such behaviors would merely entail carrying money, a violation of the laws of moving muktzah. Or should he stay out of it and not do anything, for he is not allowed to violate Shabbos in any way. If he chooses not to say or do anything, then he knows that his wife will take the baby, get a cab and cause a Jew to violate Shabbos in a biblical manner. When someone drives a vehicle he is burning fuel and thereby violating Shabbos through combustion of items, havarah. Our daf might help resolve the dilemma.
Our Gemara teaches that if a poor person is standing in the market and he stretches his hand into the private domain on Shabbos and deposits something into the hand of the house owner inside, the poor man is chayav and the house owner is patur umuttar, exempt from offering a sacrifice and is performing an act that is fully permitted. Rosh (Siman aleph) asks that while the house owner did not violate Shabbos, he has seemingly violated the law against causing other Jews to sin, lifnei iver lo titein michshol. Rosh answers that the gemara means to say that from the perspective of Shabbos laws, the action of the house owner is fully permitted, while in truth, based on the laws of not causing the blind to stumble, he may not stand and accept the item that his friend is depositing into his hand. Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Derush Vechidush) asks, what does it matter why something is prohibited? Since the man is not allowed to stand and accept the item placed in his hand, the gemara should have said that the behavior of the baal habayis is patur aval asur, exempt from a sacrifice but prohibited. Rabbi Akiva Eiger answers that these words of the Rosh are a support to the position of the Beis Hillel. Shabbos violations are very significant in Jewish law. If a person is a rebel and deliberately chooses to desecrate the Shabbos, he has the status of a rebel to the entire Torah and is not treated by Jewish law as a Jew. What about a person who is a rebel against rabbinic Shabbos prohibitions? Is he considered a person who is not part of the community? Beis Hillel argues that a person who violates rabbinic laws of Shabbos with impunity has the status of a rebel to the entire Torah. This is the significance of the gemara’s teaching that the house owner’s behavior was fully permitted from the perspective of Shabbos laws. The house owner is not considered a rebel against the entire Torah even though he might be violating lifnei iver lo titein michshol.
Perhaps, based on the insight of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in our case the man should not carry muktzah in an attempt to prevent his wife from actually hailing a cab and driving to the hospital. If his wife were to get a cab and drive to the hospital she would merely violate lifnei iver. She would be causing a Jew to violate the Shabbos biblically. She, herself, would not be violating the Sabbath and she would not be at risk of gaining the status of a rebel to the Torah. On the other hand, if the man carries muktzah, he is committing a Shabbos violation, albeit a rabbinic one. A Shabbos violation will make him have the status of rebel against the Torah and he will no longer be considered a Jew. Therefore, perhaps it is better that the man not do anything and allow his wife to do what she is insisting on doing.
Rav Chaim Kanieveski, shlita, pointed out that the man will certainly not have the status of rebel against the Torah. One can only receive the status of rebel if he deliberately commits a sin. A sin performed by mistake, shogeg, or a sin imposed on a man against his will, ones, would not render the person a mumar. In our scenario, the man is not carrying the muktzah because he wants to violate the law. He is carrying the muktzah to save his wife from sin. He is like an anus and is not a mumar. This is especially so since we are dealing with the prohibition of moving muktzah. There are those who permit moving muktzah for the sake of preventing loss of money (Orach Chaim Siman 334:2). These opinions would certainly allow a husband to move muktzah to save his beloved wife from sinning. It is therefore better for the husband to carry the money than to allow his wife to violate Torah law when our sages have never permitted such a violation. This matter deserves further study (Chashukei Chemed).
Rabbi Zev Reichman teaches Daf Yomi in his shul, East Hill Synagogue.
