Part II of III
In the first installment I identified the subject, as well as authors who had written about it. The article also defined what type of aircraft were available then, and explained why considerations to bombing at an earlier time was not possible. Also included were the negotiations between Eichmann and Jewish representatives for release of Jews from concentration camps against delivery of trucks and foodstuffs.
Between May ‘42 and June ‘44, the Allies knew Auschwitz only as a camp for Polish gentiles and Russian POWs. The Nazis were successful in keeping the mass killings at Auschwitz a secret, while killing millions of Jews during that time. Their methods of secrecy included a family camp section, where the Jews could, and did, receive Red Cross packages and were able to send postcards to the outside world, but always with return addresses that showed towns other than Auschwitz.
When did the true condition in Auschwitz become known to the West? In mid-July 1944, a 30-page detailed report by the two escapees from Auschwitz mentioned earlier, named Vrba and Wetzler, became known at least to some members of the U.S. government, at which point some action could possibly have been taken. It was mostly a very detailed report about train arrivals, treatment of prisoners and number of killings, but also included a map that unfortunately contained many errors, and consequently was not of much help to bombing planners later on.
If reasonable preparation for bombing could have begun mid-July 1944, the Allies needed accurate information, such as the camp’s location, construction and position within the camp of the crematoria and gas chambers, as well as German defenses in the area.
The Allies never ordered explicit instructions for photo reconnaissance of Auschwitz. In January 1944, IG Farben’s synthetic rubber plant at Monowitz was declared a military target and photographed. Many photos also show camp barracks that looked like any other labor or POW camp. Photo interpreters normally are told what specifically to look for—everything else is disregarded by them.
What was the technical capability to carry out the bombing? Only heavy bombers could carry out this mission since mid-range bombers, or fighter bombers, did not have the range to reach Auschwitz. Even heavy bombers were at the outer edge of their capable distance there. It is a given formula; the further the distance to the target, the more fuel has to be carried. Consequently, the more fuel is carried, the less bombs can be carried, and therefore more planes are needed to carry the required bomb load.
Beginning in July 1944, the U.S. 15th Air Force heavy bombers regularly bombed factories within a 35-mile radius of Auschwitz. One report says that on September 13, 1944, planes accidentally dropped bombs on the SS barracks at Auschwitz (see photo 3—upper left shows bombs in flight). In physics there is a formula for momentum, namely p=mass x velocity. Bombs in flight have a forward momentum, equal to the weight multiplied by the speed. The bombs shown in photo 3 are not over the SS barracks, but over the gas chamber and crematorium II in the lower left corner of photo 4.
Depending on the height of the bombs from the ground at the time the picture in photo 3 was taken, they could have hit the SS barracks, see upper right in photo 4.
Let’s talk about the railroad tracks and rail yards. We can eliminate that subject quickly. Trains sitting behind bombed-out tracks cannot get to Auschwitz. With no food, no water and the deplorable condition in the cars, it would have only been a quicker death for the prisoners. For example, there were seven railroad lines from Austria to Auschwitz. If one or more tracks would have been destroyed through bombing, there were many alternative tracks that could have been used. Moreover, railroad tracks are just lines of steel sitting on solidified bedding. Repairs could and were done many times by the Nazis overnight during the war. Photo 5 shows the many rail lines that could have been and were used for transport from Hungary to Auschwitz.
Prior to and during the Normandy invasion, practically the entire Allied heavy bomber fleet was used to destroy rail facilities in France, and to keep them destroyed, to prevent German resupply to the front where Allied forces were still on the beachhead after more than one month. Therefore, there was little chance that any bombers would have been diverted for bombing Auschwitz.
What would the costs associated with possible bombing be? It would have meant a major diversion of military resources. The 15th U.S. Air Force was also engaged in operations focusing on destroying Germany’s petroleum industry, one of the most decisive factors in Germany’s defeat.
The 15th had 1,146 heavy bombers, of which 914 were ready for duty. One expert estimated that 160 bombers would have been required to destroy the four crematoria and gas chambers, a substantial percentage of the total available bomber fleet, not an insignificant amount from a military viewpoint.
How many planes would have been lost in such an attack? Because of huge losses, the Luftwaffe rarely attacked Allied planes in Upper Silesia, but there were 79 heavy FLAK (Flieger Abwehr
Kanonen anti-aircraft guns in the IG Farben area, one of the largest concentrations in Upper Silesia.
Based on a loss of six planes during a prior raid on the adjoining factory, it is estimated that four or five bombers with their crew would have been lost in an attack on Auschwitz.
What about collateral damage? At the closest point (see photo 4), the barracks of the prisoners were less than 600 feet from the crematoria. Consequently, the chances were significant that even one stray bomb would have caused death of many inmates packed tightly in the barracks. The so-called circular error probable (CEP)—the radius in which half of the bombs would fall—was then at best 500 feet. Moreover, bombing then, particularly high-altitude bombing, was certainly not as precise as it is now. Although development of the Norden bombsight started in the late 1920s, it was first used only in March 1943. It improved the CEP, but never to a point that would have eliminated, or even considerably reduced, collateral damage. There was no such thing as precision bombing in WWII, even with the Norden bombsight.
My next and final installment, under this heading, will include a halachic discussion on the question of killing one to save another, the possibility of still rescuing Hungarian Jews, as well as my conclusion.
By Norbert Strauss
Norbert Strauss is a Teaneck resident and has been a volunteer at Englewood Hospital for the past 30 years. He was General Traffic Manager and Group VP at Philipp Brothers Inc., retiring in 1985. Prior to Englewood Hospital he was also a volunteer at the American Committee for Shaare Zedek Hospital for over 30 years, serving as treasurer and director. He frequently speaks to groups to relay his family’s escape from Nazi Germany in 1941. He has eight grandchildren and 23 great-grandchildren.
