While I support reading many midrashim deeply, I think that midrashic literalists are not without support (“What Sustains the Literalists? My Research Quest in Midrash,” January 27, 2022). In relation to midrashim, there are distinct issues that people often conflate. Authorial intent—did the midrashic author intend this literally, allegorically, or homiletically? Textual insight—is this derivation the hidden message of the Torah’s Author, or elaborate upon an understated textual theme? Historicity—is this what actually happened? Dogma—are we obligated to agree with the midrash? These issues intersect in various ways. For instance, because we feel religiously compelled to agree with Chazal, the only avenue for disagreement is declaring that Chazal didn’t mean the midrash/scientific statement literally. Yet many Geonim and Rishonim felt that midrash had non-dogmatic status, such that one can simply disagree. See Rabbi Chaim Eisen’s article in Ḥakira, “Maharal’s Be’er ha-Golah and His Revolution in Aggadic Scholarship—in Their Context and on His Terms” for a lengthy elaboration.

At the Barcelona Disputation, Ramban designated midrashim as sermons, saying, “If one believes in it, it is well and good; if one does not believe in it, he will not be harmed spiritually.” That addresses non-dogmatism, rather than literal intent or historicity. To compare, Ramban frequently disagrees with Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary, yet he doesn’t believe Ibn Ezra wrote with allegorical intent. (Ramban also endorses, as historical, the midrashic idea that Yocheved bore Moshe at 130, arguing with Ibn Ezra.)

Rambam indeed labels fools those who believe midrashim literally. However, this appears in his introduction of perek Chelek in Sanhedrin, which is filled with a particular kind of fantastic and theologically fraught midrash, such as Hashem appearing in human form and physically shaving Sancheriv with a razor (Sanhedrin 95b). Rambam singles out דרשות ברכות ופרק חלק וזולתם, but might not condemn as fools those who believe Avraham literally hid Sarah in a box.

Precedent among Rishonim for taking all midrashim literally can be found in Ramban’s words in Chelek, where he condemns contemporaries he’s met and whose books he’s read who take this position. Such Rishonim include the Tosafists Ra’sh Mishanz and Rav Moshe Taku. Abarbanel writes of Ashkenazic contemporaries with whom he disagrees about midrashic literalism. This disagreement about purpose exists in your own shul, throughout the ages, and perhaps even amongst midrashic authors.

Literal midrashic intent, at least for some midrashim, seems plausible to me. I can’t list them all here, but when the Gemara attempts to derive halacha from midrash (Chullin 5a, ravens bringing meat from Achav’s house), or where a rabbi criticizes another for “perverting the meaning of Scripture” (Sifrei to Devarim 1:1, Rabbi Yossi ben Durmaskit, because they’re real place names, not fodder for derash), it’s difficult to claim these aggadot were merely symbolic. Each requires careful consideration.