Teshuva, repentance is about returning to God after sin. However, it is not enough to change yourself. You also have to attempt to undo your sin, to fix what you broke. “And he shall return what he stole” (Lev. 5:23) is a general rule that you must restore your victim to wholeness. Rambam asks, “And what is this teshuva?” after which he explains it at length (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Teshuva 2:2). But then Rambam adds that the teshuva process he describes only refers to sins between man and God. When the sin is toward another person, you are not forgiven until you give to that person what you owe him and apologize (Ibid., 9). But do you actually have to pay him in order to repent?
I. Commitment to Repay
Rav Ya’akov Emden (18th c., Germany) was asked about a man who ran away with another man’s wife and money. The victim of this crime was left a broken man and eventually died. The new couple eventually wanted to settle in a Jewish community. The question, in part, was what this man has to do in order to return to the status of a community member in good standing. Rav Moshe Chagiz was asked this question and he sent it to other great rabbis of his time. He published their answers in his “Responsa Shtei Ha-Lechem” (no. 31). Rav Ya’akov Emden sent the longest response, also published in his “She’eilas Ya’abetz” (vol. 1, no. 79). Among other things, Rav Emden requires the sinner to apologize to the deceased’s family and at his grave, and to return the money he stole to the family. However, Rav Emden acknowledges that this might not be possible due to lack of funds. He argues that as long as the man commits to paying back the money to the best of his ability, he has fulfilled this particular requirement for teshuva.
Rav Emden offers a proof from the Gemara (Kiddushin 49b) that if a man who is known to be wicked betroths a woman on condition that he is righteous, the betrothal is effective (out of doubt) because he might have repented in his heart. Commentators ask many questions about this. Rav Emden infers from this Gemara that even if a man does not undo the harm he caused, even if he has not yet returned the object he stole, once he commits in his heart to do so, he is considered righteous. Surprisingly, Rav Emden does not quote the earlier literature on this subject.
On the halacha of betrothing a woman on condition that one is righteous, Rav Yosef Karo (Beis Yosef, Even Ha-Ezer 38) quotes Rabbeinu Yerucham who lists two views on the subject. Prof. Nachum Rakover (“Takanas Ha-Shavim,” p. 347) later claimed that these two views are from Rabbeinu Tam (Sefer Ha-Yashar, no. 140) and the Rosh (Sanhedrin, ch. 3, no. 10; Responsa, 45:3). According to the Rosh (14th c., Germany-Spain), a thief does not become qualified to testify as a witness until he repents and pays back the money. According to Rabbeinu Tam (12th c., France), as long as he commits to repay the money, he can serve as a witness. Rabbeinu Yerucham explains that the Rosh must be reading (understanding) the Gemara as excluding someone who committed an interpersonal sin because he still has to return the stolen object. In contrast, according to Rabbeinu Tam, even a thief who betroths a woman on condition that he is righteous is betrothed because if in his heart he repented and committed to repaying his theft, that alone suffices. It seems that Rav Emden assumes that Rabbeinu Tam is correct.
II. Requirement to Repay
Rav Meir (Maharam) of Lublin (17th c., Poland) was asked about a man who served as a witness on many divorce documents. It was revealed that decades earlier he had been caught stealing. Does that invalidate every divorce on which he signed (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 81)? Think of the havoc that this would cause. Any woman who remarried would have to divorce her new husband and any children to whom she gave birth would be declared illegitimate. Maharam Lublin finds a number of reasons for leniency. Among them is the common practice for a rabbi arranging a divorce to instruct the witnesses to do teshuva for all their sins before signing the document. Maharam Lublin quotes the Rosh and others that this would not work if a thief has not yet returned the stolen object. Additionally, it does not necessarily achieve atonement, which might require fasting and other acts of penance. However, in his case, the stolen money had been found and returned to the victim. Therefore, when the thief presumably repented before signing the divorce document, that sufficed to qualify him as a witness. This was one of Maharam Lublin’s considerations in ruling leniently.
III. Other Prooftexts
Rav Moshe di Trani (Mabit; 16th cen., Israel) follows Rabbeinu Tam also. In his “Beis Elokim” (Sha’ar Ha-Teshuvah, ch. 2), Mabit says that a thief is considered repentant as long as he decides in his heart—before God—that he will repay the victim. As proof, he quotes the Gemara about betrothal mentioned above. He also quotes a Gemara (Bava Metzi’a 62a) that if a father leaves something stolen in his inheritance, the sons must return it to its original owner. While technically they do not have to do so, they must do so out of respect for their father. But, asks the Gemara, are they really obligated to show respect to their sinful father? Rather, he must have repented from his sin but died before he could return the stolen item. Mabit asks if repentance is only effective if you repay the victim, then how could the father be considered repentant without returning the stolen item? Rather, concludes Mabit, a commitment to return the stolen object suffices and the father is considered righteous and worthy of respect.
Rav Chaim Yosef David Azulai (Chida; 18th cen., Israel) quotes some of the literature on the subject and attempts to respond to proofs in each direction (“Tov Ayin,” no. 6). We already responded to the proof regarding betrothal—that it does not refer to interpersonal sins. Chida responds to the stolen inheritance proof by arguing that death is different. He does not elaborate, but we can suggest that a sinner must do everything humanly possible to correct the damage caused by his sins. Wanting to repay, even sincerely committing to do so, is not sufficient. Find the money and make it happen. However, the finality of death removes all options. Death is much more than a temporary obstacle. Therefore, a repentant father who died before returning a stolen object can be considered righteous, but anyone else must fulfill his commitment to repay the victim.
Chida quotes another potential proof text from another source.. The Gemara (Berachos 19a) says that if you see a Torah scholar sin during the day, you can assume that he repented by nighttime. However, adds the Gemara, that does not apply to monetary sins because he still has to repay the damage he caused. This text seems to imply that repentance does not work if you still owe the victim money, a proof for the Rosh. Chida replies that we are discussing what one can assume about a Torah scholar. If he did not repay the damage, then there is less of a basis to assume he has repented. The text makes no claim about when repentance is possible; rather, it discusses only what an observer can assume.
When we wrong someone else, we need to do more than just teshuva. Yes, we must change ourselves and raise our religious status. However, when there is a victim involved, we must also restore his loss and apologize to him. If we cannot repay him, we must commit ourselves to attempting to do so. Even then, it is a matter of debate whether the commitment is enough. Our actions have consequences which, as responsible people, we must accept and address.
Rabbi Gil Student is the editor of Torah Musings.
