Egyptian military commanders, having learned the lessons of the 2011 revolution, were careful during the revolution of 2013 not to place themselves at the forefront, but to promote civilian figures acceptable to the public to lead during the transition period. The army and security forces will now have to deal with suppressing opposition by Muslim Brotherhood supporters, maintaining order and stability, and ensuring the effective functioning of the transition government.
Israel has been meticulous about continuing and even tightening its special relationship with the Egyptian military, which is a key to peaceful relations between the two countries. The Muslim Brotherhood government avoided any open and direct diplomatic relationship with Israel, but it did not attempt to damage the formal relationship.
The fact that the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt survived an Islamic regime that in principle rejects the State of Israel’s right to exist is an important precedent. On the other hand, had the Muslim Brotherhood government become entrenched, grown stronger, and depended less on Western economic aid, the organization’s deep ideological hostility toward Israel might have undermined Egypt and Israel’s shared security and diplomatic interests.
The likelihood of increased terrorist activity by jihadi and Salafist groups in the Sinai region, which will attempt to challenge the government in Cairo by striking at it directly, or indirectly through provocations against Israel, will undermine security in Sinai and spill over into Israeli territory. Israel must deepen its cooperation with the Egyptian army and continue to allow it to deploy troops in Sinai against jihadi infrastructures and weapons smuggling to Gaza in numbers that exceed what is dictated by the military appendix to the peace treaty.
The young people in Egypt leading the revolution also perceived HAMAS as a collaborator with the regime that was toppled and the “enforcer” of violent operations that harmed Egyptian society and the Egyptian army. In addition, HAMAS suffers from increasing criticism from the Gaza “street.” There has been a considerable response to initiatives to have the Gazan population sign petitions against the HAMAS leadership, on the Egyptian model of tamarud.
By Avner Golov, Udi Dekel, Orit Perlov, Yoel Guzansky, Oded Eran, and Anat Kurz Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University
