It’s quite possibly one of the more pervasive, widely-cited and (in certain circles) commonly accepted midrashim in our mesorah. And I struggle with it. The midrash I speak of asserts that the Avot—Abraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov and the 12 male children of Yaakov—kept all the mitzvot of the Torah.
The midrash is based on the pasuk in parshas Toldos (26:5)—in sefer Bereishis—in which HaKadosh Baruch Hu instructs Yitzchak that, despite there being a famine in the land of Canaan, the patriarch should not go down to Egypt as his father did in similar circumstances. Hashem promises that He will bless Yitzchak, and multiply his seed and give them “all these lands” (26:4). Why? As Hashem explains in the next verse, “Because Abraham hearkened to My voice (shema bekoli), and kept my charge (mishmarti), my commandments (mitzvotai), my statutes (chukotai) and my laws (vetorotai).”
Rashi states that the midrashic account explains that “hearkened to my voice” references the tests Abraham faced, “kept my charge” alludes to preventative decrees to deter people from violating Torah commands (such as rabbinic prohibitions regarding Shabbos observance), “my commandments” points to common sense prohibitions such as robbery and bloodshed, “my statutes” references commandments that the nations of the world criticize (such as shaatnes and the prohibition against eating pork), and “my laws” indicates the oral law.
This midrash is echoed in Gemara Yoma 28:a, where Rava says: “Our father Abraham fulfilled the entire Torah,” and then cites the same pasuk in sefer Bereishis (26:5). Another source that follows this claim is a mishna in Kiddushin, 4:14, which states: “We find that our forefather Avraham fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, as it says (26:5), ‘Because Avraham obeyed My voice and safeguards My ordinances, My commandments, My decrees and My teachings.’”
Following his initial use of this midrash in Bereishis 26:5, at various points in sefer Bereishis Rashi will refer to other midrashim that assert that one or another of the Avot kept all the mitzvot. For example, in Bereishis 32:5, when Yaakov is returning to the land of Canaan from Lavan’s house, he sends a message to his brother Esau, “Im Lavan garti … (I lived as a stranger with Lavan).” Rashi cites a midrash that states that the gematria of “garti” is 613 and continues: “This is as if to say, I have resided with the wicked Lavan and yet, I have kept the 613 mitzvot and not learned from his deeds.” (This interesting explanation of Yaakov’s comment does make you wonder if Esau was really as adept at spotting and interpreting gematrias as Rashi was.)
Despite Rashi’s embrace of the view that the Avot kept all the mitzvot, and the contemporary prevalence of the midrashic understanding of this pasuk, as it turns out this approach is not universally accepted by other prominent Torah commentators.
A 1995 essay by Rabbi Menachem Liebtag, “What Mitzvot Did the Avot Keep?” highlights significant differences between Chizkuni, Ibn Ezra, Radak, Rashi, Ramban and Seforno in interpreting the words, “shema bekoli, mishmarti, mitzvotai, chukotai and vetorotai,” in Bereishis 26:5. As two examples of the range of opinions, Rabbi Leibtag states that Ibn Ezra limits these words to specific mitzvot that Abraham kept, while Radak follows Ibn Ezra but adds to this all the seven mitzvot bnei Noach. Note that neither Ibn Ezra nor Radak are suggesting that Avraham or the other Avot kept all the mitzvot as we know them now.
As Rabbi Leibtag points out, the Seforno does not accept the midrashic account of the five terms in 26:5, as understood by Rashi. As elucidated by Rabbi Raphael Pelcovitz in his translation and explanation of the Seforno’s commentary: “The Seforno divides this verse into three parts: the specific commands given to Abraham by God (b’koli), the seven Noahide commandments in general (mitzvotai, chukotai and vetorotai) and mishmarti … God’s special charge and unique responsibility, i.e., to exercise kindness and to instruct sinners to return to the ways of truth. (Page 134, Seforno: “Commentary on the Torah,” published by Mesorah Publications, 1997).
I take great succor in the more nuanced views of the different commentators on this verse, because I find the midrashic explanation very difficult to rationally reconcile with different actions of the same patriarchs who were supposedly keeping all the mitzvot.
For example:
According to Bereishis 26:8, Yitzchak sports with his wife in such a way that it is noticed by the king, a clear violation of the different instructions of our tradition to act with modesty in all matters of intimacy and relations between the genders (see, for instance, Bereishis 2:25 and 9:21-27 and Tehillim 45:14).
Yaakov deceives his father—dressing as his brother Esau—in order to receive the blessing of the firstborn (Bereishis 27:18-30), a flagrant violation of the Torah commandment to distance oneself from falsehood (Shemot 23:7) and a violation of the commandment to honor one’s father (Shemot 20:12).
Yaakov marries two sisters (Bereishis 29:23-28), a clear violation of the Torah commandment not to marry two sisters (Vayikra 18:18).
Judah visits a prostitute (Bereishis 38:18), which—while not a violation of a specific mitzvah in the written law—is certainly at odds with the Torah’s preference for intimacy within married life and the stated warnings in Shemot and Bamidbar that the children of Israel not fraternize with the women of other nations.
One of the most glaring departures from our mesorah is the story of the sale of Joseph by his 10 brothers, for committing the grievous sin of acting immaturely and sharing his dreams of future grandeur (Bereishis 37). This extrajudicial sale violates basic Torah norms of adjudicating disputes and does not conform to any of the Torah’s stated penalties for specific offenses.
Accepting these actions and others by the Avot at face value, as stated in the Torah text (and not relying on the rationalizations offered by some midrashim or later commentators), I find that I simply can’t reconcile the midrashic explanation of Bereishis 26:5 to the explicit accounts of the patriarchs. Yet, I do not feel it is appropriate to summarily reject an established midrashic tradition either. So, what is an observant Jew like me—who takes our mesorah very seriously—yet has a rationalist and intellectual bent, supposed to do with this midrashic account?
The best answer I’ve found to this dilemma was an explanation by Rabbi Yehuda Amital, cited by David Silverstein in the book, “Jewish Law as a Journey,” (Yeshivat Orayta/Menorah Books, 2017). Silverstein says that Rabbi Amital taught that: “Because of the spiritual greatness of our forefathers, they were able to tap into the religious messages of the Torah without observing the practical halacha itself.” Silverstein quotes Rabbi Amital: “Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov were able to intuit these basic notions, which Chazal understands as being comparable to performing the mitzvot in the time before the Torah was given,” (pages xxviii-xxix).
The statement by Rabbi Amital—as relayed by Mr. Silverstein—goes a long way in removing the dissonance between the assertion of the midrash and the recorded behaviors of the Avot. But it still leaves me with the question of what precisely the midrash—even if it’s not accepted literally or in a sweeping fashion—comes to teach me.
I am very grateful to Dr. Elisha Russ-Fishbane, Associate Professor of Hebrew and Judaic Studies at New York University, for reviewing an earlier version of this essay and offering many helpful suggestions. This essay was also informed by a dvar Torah by Joey Cypess, “Categories of Commandments,” that appeared in the November 25, 2022 issue of B’Kol Ram, the dvar Torah newsletter of the Jewish Educational Center. I welcome feedback on this essay and can be reached at [email protected]
